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THE INFORMED HUMAN FIREWALL: THE IMPACT OF KNOWLEDGE 
DIMENSIONS ON EMPLOYEES SECURE BEHAVIOR 
By 
Ashraf Mady 
Organizations implement a variety of knowledge mechanisms such as information 
security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs and information security 
policies to influence employees’ secure behavior.  However, skills gained through these 
knowledge mechanisms have not always translated to secure behavior.  Protection 
motivation theory (PMT) is a widely used and accepted theory in information security 
behavioral research.  Nevertheless, information security research has not examined the 
impact of knowledge mechanisms on PMT psychological processes.  This study explains 
the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure behavior and seeks to 
understand how organizational knowledge mechanisms influence these key psychological 
processes that form threats perceptions.  
Drawing on the knowledge management literature, the impact of knowledge 
mechanisms on users’ threat perceptions was conceptualized and examined across three 
knowledge dimensions: breadth, depth, and finesse.  The research also applied construal 
level theory (CLT) to provide a means to measure the psychological constructs of PMT 
from an individual’s perspective.  The research conceptualizes the PMT psychological 





the psychological distance from CLT (temporal, social, spatial, and hypothetical) formed 
the threat un-desirability while response efficacy and difficulty formed the coping 
feasibility construct.   
This study empirically tested the model using a multi-method approach.  The first 
method used an experiment with 262 students to validate the CLT driven constructs and 
its impact on protection motivation.  The second study tested the overall model, including 
knowledge mechanisms dimensions, across a sample of 219 industry professionals.  The 
theoretical model was tested using a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach.  
Results show support that the psychological distance from the threat allows employees to 
perceive the personal impact of the threat.  Results also support that the key 
psychological constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, influence 
employees behavioral choices. 
This research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature.  It provides a 
greater understanding of the role of knowledge dimensions to motivate compliance.  The 
research also presented an improved model that preserves the original intent of PMT in 
the context information security.  Finally, the research presented a generalizable and 
practical business approach to a traditionally technical topic. 
Keywords: Information security, secure behavior, compliance, construal level theory, 
knowledge dimensions, protection motivation, security policies, security education and 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The rapid transformation of organizational critical information to digital format 
drastically increased the importance of information security (Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 
2018).  The motivation of employees to handle information in a secure manner has 
become a top organizational priority (Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Eargle, & Jenkins, 
2016).  Organizations are struggling to protect their critical information from intentional 
and accidental information security violations committed by employees (Johnston, 2015).  
Consequently, organizations continue to invest in information security solutions such as 
intrusion detection systems, network traffic monitoring, software and network security, 
incident management, identity and access management (Ernst & Young, 2016).  The 
purpose of this research is to understand how employees can be motivated to protect 
organizational digital assets from information security threats.  
Information security is concerned with protecting information from accidental or 
malicious security incidents such as exposure of confidential information (threat to 
information privacy) (Arachchilage & Love, 2014), deletion of data (threat to information 
availability) (Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016), and data modification (threat to 
information integrity) (Sen & Borle, 2015).  The threats to the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information have evolved to include accidental or intentional damage, 
destruction, theft, unintended or unauthorized modification, or other misuse from human 
or nonhuman threats (Whitman & Mattord, 2012).  Security incidents may have dire 
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consequences such as financial and legal liabilities, loss of reputation, negative economic 
impact, or employees’ demotivation (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010).   
The growing global spending on security solutions and services was estimated to 
reach $86 billion in 2016 to counter the increasing impact of security incidents (Anderson 
et al., 2016).  The damaging cost of data breaches was reported in 2017 to be larger in 
size than any time before, with a global average cost of $3.62 million per data breach 
(Ponemon Institute, 2017).  A market study showed that more than half of the surveyed 
global organizations reported the need to increase their security budgets by at least 25% 
to effectively protect organizational information assets against growing threats (Kessel & 
Allan, 2015).  However, despite the spending growth on organizational initiatives to 
secure information, security incidents continue to occur, and their damaging impact 
continue to grow (Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015; Safa et al., 2016; Willison & Warkentin, 
2013).  As a result, information security compliance has become a major research topic 
(Crossler et al., 2013) and a key managerial interest (Kappelman et al., 2017; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). 
Information systems are sociotechnical networks of resources and capabilities that 
dynamically connect the technical and social subsystems in an organization (Chatterjee, 
Sarker, & Valacich, 2015; Griffith & Dougherty, 2001).  Therefore, employees’ 
behaviors have a significant impact on information security (Herath & Rao, 2009a).  
Earlier approaches to secure these systems have focused primarily on technical solutions 
such as intrusion detection systems, firewall protection, and security systems design and 
implementation (Crossler et al., 2013).  These technical countermeasure solutions are 
designed mostly to protect against external threats and are therefore often ineffective 
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against employees’ information security violations (Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013).  
Hence, relying on technology-based solutions alone is not enough to eliminate threats to 
organizations (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  Surveys of major information security breaches 
show that most breaches are a result of insiders’ threats rather than external threats 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  In addition, external threats are 
targeting people’s behaviors rather than computers to breach security (Sohrabi Safa, Von 
Solms, & Furnell, 2016).  
Emerging literature concerned with information security advocates that the 
security of information systems is as much a behavioral issue as it is a technical issue  
(Burns, Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2017; Chatterjee et al., 2015; Da Veiga & Martins, 
2015).  Research has shown that successful information security can be achieved when 
organizations invest in both technical and behavioral controls (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012).  Despite this, organizations continue to focus on 
technical controls underestimating behavioral risks (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014).  
This is particularly important because researchers estimate that nearly half of information 
security breaches are caused by employees from within the organization (Tsohou, 
Karyda, & Kokolakis, 2015).  Behavioral aspects are tough to research and explain with 
consistency.  Thus, researchers have recommended continued focus on factors to 
influence employees’ secure behavior.   
Organizations implement a variety of mechanisms to distribute knowledge to 
influence employees’ secure behavior (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015).  
Dominant among these knowledge mechanisms are information security policies 
(Doherty, Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2009; Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013) and security 
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education, training, and awareness programs (SETA) (Whitman, 2003).  Practitioners and 
academic scholars continue to support the dominance of these organizational knowledge 
mechanisms to persuade employees’ secure behavior (Johnston et al., 2015; Mathews, 
2016; Moody et al., 2018). 
Information security policies are articulated knowledge regarding the compliance 
with general organizational regulations and procedures to limit the discretion of 
subordinates (Knapp, Morris, Marshall, & Byrd, 2009).  SETA programs provide 
information security knowledge that leads to comprehension, familiarity, and skills to 
manage security incidents (Safa et al., 2016).  However, researchers have found that 
SETA programs and the creation of policies and procedures have not always translated to 
the desirable behavior (Safa et al., 2016; Sommestad, Karlzén, & Hallberg, 2015).  
Consequently, researchers have called for the need to understand how knowledge 
translates to behavior in a specific situation (Burns et al., 2017).  In the scope of this 
research, the specific situation is a particular threat context.  Information security threat 
context is the circumstances that exploit vulnerability that can cause damage to 
information security attributes: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz & 
Ekelhart, 2009).  The desired behavior when dealing with any threat context (hereafter 
referred to as secure behavior) is the way in which employees act to protect information 
security attributes, which goes beyond compliance.  Thus, the key overarching research 
question is:  
How do knowledge mechanisms such as policies and SETA programs influence 
employees’ secure behavior in a particular threat context? 
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To address this question, this research aims to understand the influence of policies 
and SETA programs on employees’ psychological processes that create states and beliefs.  
The psychological process of any event determines individuals’ behavior regarding this 
event (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007).  Researchers have argued the need to 
understand how individuals make information security related decisions (Tsohou et al., 
2015).  This research studies employees’ psychological processes to explain how 
individuals make security related decisions.  The degree to which people believe they 
have control and the ability to implement threat countermeasures plays an important role 
in people’s perception of threat prevention (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008).  Also 
the context of the threat is relevant to the psychological state regarding the harmful 
outcomes (Wu, Stanton, Li, Galbraith, & Cole, 2005).  Therefore, employees’ 
psychological processes are influenced by the knowledge regarding information security 
threat in a specific context.  The present research explores the context of the threat at the 
individual level as well as the organizational knowledge in order to examine employees’ 
psychological processes.  
1.1 The Context of Threat 
The context of the threat could be known and addressed in security policies, 
known but not addressed yet in organizational policies, or unknown and ambiguous.  
Each threat to information systems is distinct and requires specific assessment, priority, 
and countermeasures (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008).  Therefore, while the overall process 
to secure information systems might be the same, the process that describes the action 
from employees regarding specific threats needs be contextualized distinctly based on the 
specific context of the threat.  Examining the context of threats to information security 
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can clarify the circumstances that may influence employees’ psychological state and how 
knowledge mechanisms can prepare employees to deal with threats that they may face.  It 
is important to understand threat context to ensure that all major threats are explained and 
to understand the associated major countermeasures available to employees (Friedman & 
Hoffman, 2008).  Without the contextualization of information security threats, 
employees may believe that they are invulnerable to threats against organizational 
information systems (Johnston et al., 2015).     
Threats to the security of information systems can be categorized as external 
threats caused by hackers, competitors, and natural disasters or as internal threats caused 
by employees’ behavior, whether malicious or accidental (Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 
1992).  Human behavior can expose information systems to threats such as data breaches 
or the unauthorized access to sensitive and confidential information (Chatterjee et al., 
2015; Ifinedo, 2012), viruses and malware can destroy critical data (Boss, Galletta, 
Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015), damage or stolen 
computers and laptops (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014), hacking, spoofing, 
phishing, policy violation, or opportunism for personal gain (Chatterjee et al., 2015).  
Also threats can come from natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, or floods 
that destroy organizations’ infrastructures or equipment, which prevent physical access to 
systems or causing loss of critical data (Loch et al., 1992).   
Threats can come from software infected with computer programs, called 
spyware, that collect data and monitor user activities (Chatterjee et al., 2015; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010).  In addition, spam emails or suspicious websites can threaten data 
privacy and confidentiality (Ifinedo, 2012; Posey et al., 2015).  Furthermore, threats from 
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the use of unauthorized equipment or software or from violating organizational use 
policies can expose or destroy confidential information (Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 
2012).     
Researchers in the psychology domain found that the context of a threat 
influences an individual’s psychological state because it explains the degree of harm 
associated with the threat (Wu et al., 2005).  Threat context enables employees to 
understand and assess threats (Babar, Mahalle, Stango, Prasad, & Prasad, 2010).  A 
user’s psychological state can influence his or her evaluation and facilitate the 
development of favorable behavioral intentions (Ho, Ke, & Liu, 2015).  Thus, this 
research focuses on clarifying the psychological attributes of the threat environment to 
distinguish between threats and to see how such attributes affects the downstream actions 
of an individual.  
1.2 Knowledge Mechanisms: Organizational Security Policy and Training 
Knowledge regarding compliance in the organization is gained by articulated 
processes and procedures (Sanchez, 1997) or through training (S. Gupta, Bostrom, & 
Huber, 2010).  Information security policies and SETA programs have widely been 
established in the organizations as the sources for knowledge to safeguard and secure 
information (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015).  Information security policies 
communicate compliance requirements, incidents definition, and information risk 
management in order to assess awareness pertaining to information protection (Da Veiga 
& Martins, 2015).  Security policies serve as internal regulation and law with the 
intention to direct the behaviors of employees toward information security (Chen et al., 
2015).  SETA programs are procedural mechanisms implemented in the organization so 
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that information security becomes a natural inherent aspect in employees daily jobs 
(Chen et al., 2015).  Researchers suggested that SETA programs are recommended to 
enable security polices because employees need to be trained, educated, and motivated to 
follow security policies and procedures (Chen et al., 2015).  Organizations implement 
security policies and SETA programs with great variations depending on various factors, 
such as: industry, size of the organization, degree of information intensity in the 
organization, and the characteristics of its employees (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  Literature 
shows that regardless of the knowledge sources, having adequate knowledge regarding 
information security is a prerequisite to performing any normal activity in a secure 
manner (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010).  Knowledge provides theoretical, strategic, 
and practical understanding of the available course of action (Sanchez, 1997).   
Thus, instead of focusing on security policies and SETA programs directly, 
researchers in information security literature have advocated for focusing on knowledge 
dimensions, such as the comprehensiveness of knowledge (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  As a 
result, information security research focused mainly on the use of the comprehensiveness 
of knowledge without explaining whether that means depth of knowledge, breadth of 
knowledge, or creative use of knowledge.  Information security literature currently does 
not explicitly leverage knowledge dimensions.  To address this gap, this study draws 
from the knowledge management literature, as it presents a more complete picture of 
knowledge dimensions that are not yet explored in information security literature.  
Scholars studying knowledge management explained that knowledge is a 
multidimensional construct that provides outcomes unique to each of the knowledge 
dimensions (Sanchez, 1997).  Knowledge dimensions are breadth, depth, and finesse 
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(Munro et al., 1997).  Knowledge breadth is the variety of knowledge, knowledge depth 
represents the completeness of knowledge regarding a specific subject, and finesse is the 
ability to apply innovativeness and creativity (Munro et al., 1997).  Breadth of 
information security knowledge, increases employees’ security awareness and prevents 
duplication of efforts saving time and money (Safa et al., 2016).  Depth of knowledge is 
required to learn how to identify a threat and know the specific steps needed to deal with 
that threat (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015).  Finesse embodies creativity, self- sufficiency, 
and ability to learn new things (Mills & Chin, 2007).  Overall, this research investigates 
the embedded knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and finesse) as key factors that 
influence employees’ psychological processes and subsequent behavior.  
1.3 Psychological Process 
All behaviors are driven by the psychological process (Trope et al., 2007).  
Researchers have used various behavioral theories in the context of information security 
to study compliance behavior.  For example, Chatterjee et al. (2015) investigated 
employees’ attitude and subjective norms regarding security.  They applied the theory of 
planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  Chen et al. (2012) applied the general deterrence theory 
to explain the impact of punishment and deterrence mechanisms on security.  Liang and 
Xue (2009) tested the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) to explain user 
rejection of malicious IT artifacts.  Several researchers used protection motivation theory 
(Rogers, 1975) in the study of employees’ behavioral change and focused on compliance 
motivation (Sommestad et al., 2015).  The revised version of protection motivation 
theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983) has been noted as one of the 
dominant theories for predicting individuals’ intentions to engage in protective actions 
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(Ifinedo, 2012).  PMT is used extensively to investigate behavior in the context 
information security (Boss et al., 2015).   
This research draws on the revised version of PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rogers, 1983) to explain the psychological processes that motivate individuals to engage 
in protective behavior when faced with threats.  PMT postulates that individuals’ 
motivation to protect themselves from any threat is a result of the outcome of two 
appraisal processes, threat appraisal and coping appraisal (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).  
Threat appraisal is an individual’s perception of the probability of exposure or 
vulnerability to a threat, as well as the perceived severity of the consequences of that 
threat (Boss et al., 2015; Ifinedo, 2012).  Coping appraisal is the process by which 
individuals evaluate the feasibility of the available risk mitigating action or response 
efficacy, their own ability to contribute to the recommended protective response or self-
efficacy, and the response cost (Posey et al., 2015). 
Although PMT has been used in a sizable number of studies in the context of 
information security, the key variables’ impact, significance, and directions have shown 
great variations and inconsistencies (Posey et al., 2015).  Several researchers supported 
the positive impact of the severity of threat on compliance motivation as proposed by 
PMT (Sommestad et al., 2015).  In contrast, other researchers reported a negative impact 
of threat severity (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Warkentin, Walden, Johnston, & Straub, 2016) 
or found its impact to be insignificant (Ifinedo, 2012).  As a result, scholars argue that the 
context of application is a potential reason for PMT inconsistent results (Johnston et al., 
2015).  Researchers have called for future research to address the inconsistent findings 
regarding the impact of each of PMT constructs in the context of information security 
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(Warkentin et al., 2016).  To address the inconsistencies, this research applied PMT 
based on its original intent that requires threats to be on a personal level and not a threat 
against the organization.   
This research introduces an employee’s psychological distance to security threats 
to apply PMT, as originally intended, from a personal level.  Psychological distance is a 
personal reference regarding an event (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  Psychological distance 
impacts the way individuals perceive events (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  Overall, this 
research draws on psychological distance theory to dimensionalize the threat environment 
and then investigates how these dimensions impact the psychological process that leads 
to end-user behavior.  Such an approach enables information security threats to be 
personal threats and preserves the original intention of PMT.  
1.4 Specific Research Questions 
This study understands how the use knowledge dimensions in SETA and security 
policies can motivate individuals to comply with the organization’s information security 
regulations and procedures.  The research answers the following questions: 
Q1: What are the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure 
behavior when dealing with an information security threat? 
Q2: How do organizational knowledge mechanisms such as SETA programs and 
policies influence key psychological processes of threat perception?  
The research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature.  The research 
develops a theoretically grounded model for information security compliance that 
addresses current gaps in literature.  The study investigates knowledge dimensions in 
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SETA programs and security policies as an input to psychological process to construct 
personal perceptions regarding specific information security threats.  The research 
provides greater understanding to the role of knowledge dimensions and employees’ 
psychological state that motivates compliance.  While the existing literature has 
successfully expanded our knowledge and understanding regarding factors influencing 
information security compliance, the conventional application of PMT in the field of 
information security caused inconsistent and conflicting results.  This research presents 
an approach to limit results variations and allows PMT to work as designed in the context 
of information security.   
This research provides a generalizable approach for any incident-driven behavior 
and a practical business approach to a topic that is typically viewed as a technical 
problem.  Understanding the unique outcomes to each of the knowledge dimensions 
provides strategies regarding the use of organizational knowledge mechanisms in the 
context of information security.  This work presents an approach to enable practitioners 
and scholars to establish the linkage between security needs and job demands with an 
approach that enables the organization to influence compliance without hindering 
productivity.  It highlights the use of SETA programs in the organization to develop more 
effective and attainable information security policies and procedures. 
1.5 Research Design 
This research applied quantitative methods to examine the relationships between 
variables to address the research questions.  The research empirically tested the model 
using two-study approach.  The first study was a scenario-based experiment to answer the 
first research question regarding key psychological processes of threat perception.  The 
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experiment was conducted with 262 university students.  Participants were provided 
various manipulation scenarios that represented different psychological distances.  To 
achieve this, the researcher manipulated the degree of abstraction or concreteness of 
specific threat contexts.  Students were asked to fill a behavioral focused questionnaire to 
empirically validate the instrument that measures the impact of threat un-desirability and 
coping feasibility on protection motivation.    
The second study empirically validated the entire theoretical model, including 
input, process, and output.  This approach was consistent with seminal information 
systems literature.  Literature supports that instrument validation should precede the 
research model empirical validation (Straub, 1989).  Data were collected from 219 
employees across various organization with varied responsibilities and technical 
competences.  The theoretical model was tested using structural equation modeling 
(SEM) approach.  The findings from this study can be used in future quantitative studies 
in researching the design and development of training and organizational policies 
concerned with employees’ compliance behavior. 
1.6 Organization and Overview of the Dissertation Proposal 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  Following this introductory chapter, 
which presented the topic importance and research motivation, chapter 2 offers a review 
of the related literature.  In chapter 2, support is drawn from reported empirical results 
and findings relevant to the gaps outlined in chapter 1.  Chapter 3 presents the research 
theoretical model and hypotheses.  In this chapter, the research model is presented, the 
constructs are explained, and justifications for the hypotheses are provided.  Chapter 4 
discusses the research design.  This chapter establishes the quantitative multi-method 
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approaches followed to validate empirically the research model.  Chapter 4 explains the 
measurements, sample frame, controls, and statistical procedures.  Chapter 5 presents the 
data analysis.  This chapter includes the statistical data analysis, including constructs 
validity and reliability.  Chapter 5 also includes a comparative analysis and results 
comparison between the traditional PMT model and the model presented in this research.  
The research discussion is presented in the final chapter, chapter 6.  Chapter 6 discusses 





CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the behavioral research in the information security literature has focused 
on two streams of research: a) compliance behavior and b) training and policy initiatives.  
The relevant research findings in both these areas are summarized in this chapter.  This 
chapter explores the information security literature and points out relevant key findings 
and gaps.  The review of the relevant literature brings together the major findings to 
advance the understanding and to show how this research can address key gaps.  
The chapter starts by briefly describing a framework to integrate these research 
streams.  Next, we draw upon knowledge mechanisms, SETA and security policies, and 
PMT to understand existing literature.  After having summarized the literature review and 
the gaps, the last section presents a case for expanding the existing models of 
investigation to address the gaps highlighted.  To review the related information security 
literature, a broad review of seminal research was performed.  This broad review focused 
on understanding the impact of employees’ behavior on information security.  Then, the 
review focused on employees’ behavioral motivation to understand relationships among 
factors influencing the main overarching research question.  The literature review follows 
a chronological order based on the foundation of the knowledge provided by previous 
high-impact research through the most recent publications to identify findings and gaps 





A holistic and systematic framework to summarize the literature is the input-
process-outcome framework.  Input-process-outcome was proposed by Garris, Ahlers, 
and Driskell (2002).  In this perspective, the input is instructional content, process is the 
development of judgement, and the output is the influenced behavior.  This framework 
allows us to capture the key influencers towards behavior as well as understand the 
process through which such a behavior decision was arrived at (see Figure 1).  Input 
represents the elements in the environment that influence the target behavior under 
investigation, which in this case is secure behavior.  Three elements studied in the 
literature are a) the threat context, b) SETA programs, and c) organizational policies.  
The latter two factors deal with the transfer of knowledge and are mentioned as 
knowledge mechanisms in the figure.  Process deals with an individual’s cognitive and 
affective psychological processes involved in arriving at the behavioral choice.  Research 
in the information security literature has focused on psychological processes.  This 
chapter focuses on the same. The outcome represents the behavioral choice that the end-






Figure 1. Literature review organization 
Following the explained systematic approach, the review of information security 
literature first clarifies the two inputs stemming from the literature: threat context and 
knowledge mechanisms.  The context of a threat is relevant to the impact on the 
individual’s psychological state (Wu et al., 2005).  Then the empirical research concerned 
with knowledge mechanisms is synthesized to understand its influence on employees’ 
psychological processes.  Finally, the applications of PMT are reviewed in the literature 
to explain the psychological processes that motivate employees’ secure behavior in a 
business environment.  The major findings are organized to assimilate the current state of 
the information security literature and to point out the gaps that need to be addressed to 
explain how knowledge mechanisms influence employees’ psychological processes and 





2.1 Inputs - Threat Context 
Threat context refers to the circumstances that exploit vulnerability caused by 
technical, administrative, or physical weaknesses that can cause damage to information 
security attributes such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz & Ekelhart, 
2009).   Table 1 summarizes context of information security threat in the literature.  
Threats to information security can be man-made or non-human threats (Loch et al., 
1992), and each threat will have a certain degree of severity  (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). 
Table 1: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding Threat Context 
Literature Threats/Implied Threats 
Babar et al. (2010) Reveal identity, expose authentication, denial 
of service, and tampering with organization’s 
hardware 
Boss et al. (2015) Loss of critical data and data corruption 
Chatterjee et al. (2015) Hacking, phishing, unauthorized personal use 
of IT artifacts 
Chen et al. (2012) Email attachments and suspicious internet sites   
D'Arcy et al. (2014) Complex and stressful security standards   
Friedman and Hoffman (2008) Malware, phishing, spoofing, loss, and theft of 
devices, and user policy violations 
Ifinedo (2012) Data breaches or the unauthorized access 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) Spyware defense  
Johnston et al. (2015) Data breach 
Loch et al. (1992) Natural disasters, unauthorized access, denial 
of service, reverse engineering, theft of 
equipment, data destruction, computer viruses, 
or employee fault 
Posey et al. (2015) Data corruption 
Siponen et al. (2014) Damaged or stolen computers and laptops 
Vance et al. (2012) Computer viruses and unauthorized access to 
confidential information 
Whitman (2003) Malicious software, system failure, mistakes, 






Threats to information exist and are inevitable, whether or not perceived by the 
individual (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).  The literature suggests that there can be many 
types of threats, ranging from man-made or non-human threats (Loch et al., 1992).  
Researchers found that the most impactful man-made threats are malicious software, 
system failure, and employees errors whether intentional or accidental (Whitman, 2003).  
Researchers also addressed non-human security threats such as natural disasters like 
earthquakes, floods, wildfires, or hurricanes that can destroy or prevent access to 
information systems (Loch et al., 1992). 
 Threats to the security of information were also classified based on the impact on 
business processes.  Babar et al. (2010) described three threat categories: identification, 
communication, and physical threats.  Identification threats are the threats that reveal the 
identity and the authentication process for device, user, or session.  Denial of service is an 
example of a communication threat.  The physical threats include theft of equipment, 
facility destruction, tampering with organization’s hardware, or product reverse 
engineering.  Also, studies of information security threats addressed the dilemma of 
ethics and the ethical use of IT artifacts.  Unauthorized personal use of IT artifacts 
influenced by opportunism and personal gain is an example of a threat to the security of 
information systems caused by the unethical use of information systems (Chatterjee et al., 
2015).  Finally, information security research has identified sixty-seven unique 
protection-motivated behaviors for employees to follow in the organization (Posey, 
Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013). 
 This extensive focus on threat context has resulted in researchers focusing on 





2012; Johnston et al., 2015), use of an encrypted USB drive, or locked workstations 
(Johnston et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015) to prevent data breaches.  Such research, 
however, does not focus on the process through which an end user understands and deals 
with the threat.  The operation of a threat has been often inferred from its effects rather 
than the direct assessment of the threat itself (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999).  As a result, the research provided sixty-seven different behavioral solutions 
influenced by information security threat effects (Posey et al., 2013) resulting in threat 
interpretational difficulties (Branscombe et al., 1999).  Threats to the security of the 
information are distinct and require specific assessments and behavior judgments by the 
end-user (Friedman & Hoffman, 2008).  
 In this research, instead of focusing on specific threat types, the focus is on how 
any threat is perceived by the end-user.  This allows the research to be generalizable 
across different threat contexts.  Furthermore, it provides additional relevance for the 
study because threats continue to evolve over time (Whitman, 2003).  
2.2 Inputs - Knowledge Mechanisms: Policies and SETA 
Extant literature suggests that comprehensive security controls in the organization 
rely on security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs (Whitman, 2003), 
as well as policies that provide series of guidelines and procedures relating to the 
prevention, detection, and correction cycle of information security management (Chen et 
al., 2015).   
Researchers described information security policies as important technical 
oriented documents implemented in the organization to proactively safeguard corporate 





Information security policies were applied to communicate general rules regarding 
compliance requirements (Knapp et al., 2009) and to identify information risk 
management process in order to assess awareness pertaining to information protection 
(Da Veiga & Martins, 2015).  Policies safeguard against information abuse, destruction 
and misuse (Safa et al., 2016).  They were described as a useful mechanism for shaping 
or influencing employees’ behaviors with respect to the use of organizational resources 
(Ifinedo, 2012).  Researchers identified security policies as internal regulation and law 
intended  to modify employees’ behaviors toward information security (Chen et al., 2015; 
Vance et al., 2013) through the communication of  compliance requirements and 
employees’ responsibilities to protect organizational information and technology 
resources (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Tsohou et al., 2015).   
Researchers explained that SETA programs are procedural mechanisms 
implemented in the organization to manifest information security policy requirements 
(Da Veiga & Martins, 2015) so that information security becomes a natural inherent 
aspect in employees’ daily jobs (Chen et al., 2015).  The three elements of SETA are 
education, training, and awareness (Posey et al., 2015; Whitman, 2008).  SETA programs 
were applied to communicate goals, expectations, and procedures designed for employees 
to encourage their information security compliance behavior (Johnston et al., 2015).  
Literature proposed the use of SETA as a strategy to promote information security 
compliance and minimize accidental security breaches (Warkentin et al., 2016).  SETA 
programs were used to aid individuals to form the desired security perception (Tsohou et 
al., 2015).  Researchers have suggested that SETA programs could complement policies 





employees were found to be more positive regarding security requirements than untrained 
employees (Da Veiga & Martins, 2015).  Table 2 below summarizes literature 
suggestions regarding information security policies and SETA programs. 
Table 2: Literature Summary of Findings Regarding Policies and SETA 
Research Security Policies SETA Programs Findings 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010) 







and simplify policy 
requirements  
Policies and SETA 
have a positive 
impact, mediated 




Chatterjee et al. 
(2015) 
Defines acceptable 
use of IT artifacts   
Provide moral 
education and 
awareness of safe 
and ethical use 
Results imply the 
negative impact of 
Policies and SETA 
on intentions for 
unethical use of IT 
artifacts 
Chen et al. (2015) Internal vision, 
regulations, and law 







security policies  
Results support the 
positive impact of 
SETA on policy 
awareness. 
D'Arcy, Hovav, 
and Galletta (2009) 
Define rules and 
guidelines for the 





to ensure the 
success of security 
policies  




systems misuse  


















Doherty et al. 
(2009) 
Business document 









Breadth of the 
existing policies is 
modest and highly 
techno-centric 





must be met to 
safeguard IS assets  




SETA can have a 
positive impact on 
compliance 
Johnston et al. 
(2015) 
Recommended 
secure behavior   
Articulate and 
communicate 
security goals and 
expectations 
Results imply the 
positive effect of 
SETA on policy 
compliance 
Knapp et al. (2009) The single most 
important control to 
protect valuable 
information First step 
towards the 








secure practice  
Posey et al. (2015) Organizational rules 




foundation for the 
appraisals of 
threats and 
available responses  
SETA programs 
have a significant 
positive impact on 
response efficacy 
Safa et al. (2016) Address information 








Training has a 
positive effect on 
attitudes toward 
compliance 
Tsohou et al. 
(2015) 
Define what is 
expected of 
individuals  











Vance et al. (2013) Internal regulation to 





bring awareness to 
policy 
requirements 
Awareness has a 














Results imply that 
SETA programs 




Overall, the research in this area shows that training and organizational policy 
mechanisms have a positive impact, highlighting the importance of these two 
mechanisms (Chen et al., 2015).  An additional conclusion that can be derived from the 
above table is that the both policy and training have a similar impact.  Both serve as 
knowledge transfer mechanisms (Da Veiga & Martins, 2015).  Researchers have 
generally treated training and policy-based models as an input-output model, thus 
ignoring the critical role of process (Tsohou et al., 2015).  Transforming security 
behavior goes beyond the communication and acquisition of knowledge and awareness of 
threats and security (Johnston et al., 2015).  Researchers have argued that in order for 
knowledge mechanisms to succeed, there is a need to have a deeper understanding of the 
individuals’ process of information that stimulates behavioral change (Warkentin et al., 
2016).  An understanding of the influence that training and policy have on key process 
constructs will help trainers and researchers better design training and write policies.  
Additionally, as can be seen from Table 2, there is great variation in policies and training 





mechanisms differently.  This has resulted in variations in impact (D'Arcy et al., 2009; 
Warkentin et al., 2016).  This results in a lack of generalizability of the results.  
In this research, instead of focusing on the effectiveness of specific policy and 
training, the focus is on the knowledge dimensions that these mechanisms embed.  
Information security researchers have addressed the comprehensiveness as the only 
dimension (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  However, knowledge management perspectives see 
knowledge as a multidimensional construct (Sanchez, 1997).  The three independent 
dimensions of knowledge that shape employees’ abilities are breadth, depth, and finesse 
(Munro, Huff, Marcolin, & Compeau, 1997).  Knowledge breadth is the horizontal 
dimension that captures the understanding of a varied and diverse range of information 
and factors (Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2007).  Knowledge depth represents the 
completeness of the user's knowledge that leads to mastery of a particular subject or task 
while finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness and creativity (Munro et al., 1997).  
These three dimensions have been studied in the knowledge management literature and 
help explain comprehensiveness better.  These dimensions exist across all trainings and 
policies (although in different levels) and thus, they provide the ability to account for 
variance across policies and training.  The application of knowledge across these three 
dimensions also helps in providing guidelines that are more specific to practitioners.  
2.3 Process - Psychological Process 
PMT has become a dominant theoretical foundation used to investigate behavior 
in information security (Boss et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 2013; Herath & Rao, 2009b).  
PMT argues that intentions are motivated by individuals’ assessment of threats based on 





Warkentin, 2010) and is thus used to summarize this section.  PMT was originally 
developed for disease prevention and health promotion (Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 
2000).  The theory was developed to explain the effects of fear appeals on health attitudes 
and protective behavior (Rogers, 1975).  The theory was revised, Figure 2, to include a 
broader range of factors and became a general model of attitude change (Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983; Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 2005; Rogers, 1983).  As indicated in the 
previous chapter, this research drew on the revised version of PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 
1983; Rogers, 1983).  In this section, PMT was used to organize existing literature, 
pointing out some major findings and gaps. 
 





2.4 Threat Appraisal 
Threat appraisal is the individual’s assessment of the probability of exposure or 
vulnerability and the assessment of the severity of that threat (Ifinedo, 2012).  Table 3 
summarizes research findings regarding the application of threat appraisal constructs and 
the impact on employees’ behavioral intentions.  The table shows threat appraisal 
constructs that were tested and the constructs that were not included in the summarized 
literature.  The table also shows whether the tested threat appraisal constructs reflected 
positive, negative, or insignificant impacts on compliance intentions.  Each component is 
discussed next.  








Boss et al. 
(2015) 
Positive impact 
when perceived on 
a personal level 
Positive impact 
when applied only 
on personal level 
Systems and information 




Positive impact Positive impact Organizational information 
security policy compliance 
Chen et al. 
(2012) 
Positive impact Not included Password management, 
email attachments, and 





through severity of 
punishment had a 
negative impact on 
compliance 




Positive impact Not supported Security breach that leads 
to denial of service and 







Not supported Positive impact Information access control, 
downloading illegal 









when applied only 
on personal level 
Positive impact 
when applied only 
on personal level 
Theft of password, login 
information, or 





Not Supported Positive impact Antivirus protection 
Y. Lee and 
Larsen 
(2009) 




The adoption of 
antimalware software 
Posey et al. 
(2015) 
Positive impact 
when applied only 
on personal level 
Not Supported Protection from 
unauthorized login, 
protecting stored data, 
appropriate use of email 




Positive impact Positive impact Locking office doors, 
turning off PCs at the end 
of the day, and password 
protection 
Vance et al. 
(2012) 
 
Positive impact Not supported Sharing passwords, failing 
to lock or log off a 
workstation, allowing 
reading confidential 
material at printers 
Warkentin 
et al. (2016) 
Positive impact Positive impact 
when applied only 




Use of encryption to 
protect data, careful when 
opening attachment, 
perform security updates, 
perform antivirus scans 
frequently, change 





the computer, back up 
regularly 
 
Threat severity is an individual’s perception regarding the level or the degree of 
the damaging impact of the threat (Sommestad et al., 2015).  In the context of 
information security policy compliance, it refers to the evaluation of the severity of the 
damage and the possible negative events resulting from noncompliance with the 
recommended information security policies (Vance et al., 2012).  The behavior of 
individuals is influenced by their appraisal of the damaging impact of a threat and its 
unwarranted consequences (Sommestad et al., 2015).  The overall assessment of severity 
of the threat is conceptualized to exert significant positive influence on an employee’s 
attitude toward compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen et al., 2014).  However, 
researchers have also found a limited or even negative impact of threat severity on 
compliance intention in certain contexts.  For example, Herath and Rao (2009a) 
conceptualized threat severity by the increased deterrent effect of severity of punishment.  
They found that severity of punishment had a negative effect on compliance intentions.  
To explain the results, they argued that the excessive use of punishment would create 
hostile, stressful, and disruptive work environment.  Warkentin et al. (2016) also 
supported that threat severity negatively impacts compliance intentions and argued that 
the exposure to too much fear would generate stress, resulting in a behavior that is 
oriented towards alleviating that fear rather than dealing with the threat itself.  Other 
researchers have addressed the importance of the context of application on perception 
arguing that the threat severity will have a positive impact on compliance intentions only 





Threat vulnerability is the extent of being susceptible to damage caused by 
information security risks (Anderson et al., 2016).  The persuasive communication of the 
person’s vulnerability to the threat is used to deliver fear that will motivate individuals to 
comply with the recommended protective response (Boss et al., 2015).  Researchers 
found vulnerability to security threats to have a significant impact on behavioral 
intentions toward compliance (Johnston et al., 2015).  Researchers also conducted 
experimental research that produced results which show that in order for threat 
vulnerability to positively influence compliance behavior, the vulnerability must be on a 
personal level and not toward the organization (Warkentin et al., 2016).   
However, other researchers reported conflicting results regarding the impact of 
vulnerability on behavioral intentions.  Researchers found threat vulnerability to have an 
insignificant impact on protection motivation (Posey et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012).  
These results are inconsistent with PMT.  Researchers explained that individuals often 
believe that they are invulnerable to threats, and others are more vulnerable to threats 
than themselves with the naïve perception that bad things happen to other people 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) or because they are overconfident and feel protected by 
the organizational systems (Y. Lee & Larsen, 2009).  Literature also shows vulnerability 
had an insignificant impact on attitude towards compliance; however, the threat was 
contextualized on the organizational level instead of the individual level (Herath & Rao, 
2009b).     
Overall, a review of threat appraisal research in information security behavior has 
found considerable variance in results.  Researchers have suggested this is primarily due 





itself (Johnston et al., 2015).  Additionally, the second order nature of threat appraisal has 
never really been questioned.  These constructs originally came from an economic 
process model and were then applied to a variance model.  This created issues regarding 
consistency, reliability and accuracy of measures.  As a result, researchers keep adding 
new constructs like commitment and maladaptive rewards to increase results consistency.  
In this research, we suggest that threat appraisal should be re-conceptualized by 
grounding it in the context.  This new construct allows researchers to better measure it as 
a psychological variable and more clearly explain the underlying psychological process.  
2.5 Coping Appraisal 
The coping appraisal is the process by which individuals evaluate how effective, 
manageable, and feasible the available risk mitigating response can be (Ifinedo, 2012).  
The components of coping appraisal are self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response 
cost (Boss et al., 2015).  Table 4 summarizes the research findings regarding the 
application of coping appraisal constructs.  The table shows which coping appraisal 
constructs were tested and which constructs were not included in the summarized 
literature.  The table also shows whether the tested coping appraisal constructs reflected 
positive, negative, or insignificant impacts on compliance intentions.  Each component is 
discussed next.  
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of USB drive loss and 
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virus infection 
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perform antivirus scans 
frequently, change 
password frequently, 
lock the computer, 
back up regularly 
 
Response efficacy is the belief that the available mitigating response will work 
and can successfully diminish the threat (Floyd et al., 2000).  Witte (1992) explains that 
efficacy exists as an environmental or message cue, which refers to the effectiveness of 
the recommended response.  The perceived response efficacy refers to an individual's 
beliefs as to whether a defined action effectively mitigate the threat.  Information security 
literature reflects the positive impact of response efficacy on compliance intentions.  
Researchers continue to debate the influence of response efficacy.  Some researchers 
found that industry type plays a significant role to determine the degree of its impact (D. 
Lee et al., 2008) or reported different results based on the context of the threat (Boss et 
al., 2015).  Others reported results consistent with PMT propositions (Johnston et al., 
2015; Siponen et al., 2014).   Researchers also argued factors that would impact the 
significance of response efficacy.  Ifinedo (2012) argued that response efficacy was 
enabled by employees’ relevant knowledge, competence, and capability to implement 





efficacy is more appealing when the mitigating task relative to personal goals and aligned 
with individuals’ abilities.   
Self-efficacy is the degree to which individuals believe in their own abilities to 
perform what is required to avert the threat (Floyd et al., 2000).  Researchers have argued 
that self-efficacy is the single biggest predictor of behavioral change in individuals 
(Bandura, 1977).  Information security literature supports the significant positive impact 
of self-efficacy on compliance intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Ifinedo, 2012).  
Warkentin et al. (2016) argued that self-efficacy had the strongest positive impact to 
influence compliance intentions.  However, other researchers argued factors that can 
weaken or even diminish the impact of self-efficacy on compliance.  For example, 
D'Arcy et al. (2014) argued that the increased complexity of security policy requirement 
would have a negative impact on self-efficacy.  Other researchers could not even validate 
the impact of self-efficacy on compliance intentions (Posey et al., 2015).  On the contrast 
to prior findings, Chatterjee et al. (2015) suggested that self-efficacy is negatively 
associated with ethical use because it enables employees to manipulate technology 
maliciously. 
Response cost is mainly the extra time and efforts needed to mitigate the risk 
(Ifinedo, 2012; Sommestad et al., 2015).  The literature generally agreed on the 
significant negative impact of response cost on compliance (Boss et al., 2015; Herath & 
Rao, 2009b).  However, Ifinedo (2012)  and D. Lee et al. (2008) found no support for the 
impact of response cost on compliance.  More researchers focused on different factors 
that can impact the evaluation of response cost.  D'Arcy et al. (2014) confirmed that the 





asserted that cost of compliance is calculated as lack of productivity (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Posey et al., 2015).  Existing literature has also showed that not only time and 
efforts impact cost of compliance, but also the loss of business opportunities will cause 
response cost to be perceived significantly higher (Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Iivari, 
2006).  Our reading of the literature shows that when the response cost is measured at an 
individual level, the results are positive.  
Overall, the extant research shows significant variance in the impact of cost 
appraisal factors on protection motivation.  Additionally, researchers have defined 
components of cost appraisal differently (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2015), which 
leads to construct validity issues.  Finally, response efficacy and self-efficacy have been 
defined at the task level, rather than at the threat level.  This is inconsistent because a user 
might have multiple means of mitigating the threat  (S. Gupta et al., 2010). 
In this study, we re-conceptualized the intent of coping by focusing on the 
individual’s perception of the task to be performed.  This study removed all components 
that are task-irrelevant and focused on the perception of the effort required for the coping 
mechanism.  Similar to threat appraisal reconceptualization, this also helps move the 
construct from an economic model brought to behavioral research to a psychological 
construct in behavioral research.  
2.6 Outcome - Behavioral Intentions 
The primary focus of PMT is to predict behavior.  It contends that protection 
motivation is the primary driver of such behavior (Boss et al., 2015; Maddux & Rogers, 
1983).  Protection motivation reflects the individual’s intentions to engage in protective 





compliance behavior (See table 3-4). Compliance behavior or conformation to 
established rules and standards assumes that well defined ways of handling known 
threats.  This might not be true.  Additionally, it focuses on a perceived (and prescribed) 
solution rather than on mitigating the threat.  Studying behaviors as isolated events can 
inhibit researchers’ understanding of the complex psychological processes surrounding 
the overall superset of human behaviors (Posey et al., 2013).  In this research, the focus is 
on secure behavior instead of compliance.  We conceptualized secure behavior as being a 
superset of compliance behavior, also encompassing actions that a user might see fit in 
case of threat.  
2.7 Chapter Summary  
In sum, this chapter presented a literature review of extant literature in 
information security training and behavior.  The review showed the variance in training 
and policies between studies.  This highlighted the need to have an overarching 
framework to understand and compare different types of training / policy from a user’s 
perspective.  The review also highlighted the inconsistent results regarding threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal.  Additionally, the review also highlighted the fact that 
different components of PMT were conceptualized at different levels, i.e., task, context, 
and individual.  All of this emphasized the need to re-conceptualize the psychosocial 
process.  
The next chapter presents a model addressing these concerns.  The model uses an 
established multi-dimensional view of the knowledge mechanisms (training/policy).  This 





psychological processes that drive behavior are conceptualized at the threat level, which 





CHAPTER 3 – THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter presents the research model for this study.  It builds on the findings 
and the gaps identified in the previous chapter, and outlines how the identified gaps were 
addressed in the model.  An overview of the research model is presented first.  Next, the 
various constructs of the model are discussed.  Theoretical arguments and testable 
hypothesis are presented for each causal link.  Appropriate research is cited where 
necessary.  The chapter ends with an overview of the research method proposed to test 
the model.  
3.1 Research Model  
The overarching question for this research is concerned with understanding the 
way knowledge mechanisms can influence employees’ secure behavior in a particular 
threat context.  The research model presented, shown in Figure 3, builds on the input-
process-output framework outlined in the earlier chapter.  Threat context represents the 
events or conditions that expose information systems to potential threats.  The model 
conceptualized training and policy (knowledge mechanism) across three dimensions: 
breadth, depth, and finesse.  The psychological process preserved the intent of protection 
motivation theory (PMT) while re-conceptualizing the constructs based on the threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility.  Threat un-desirability is the perception of the degree 
to which an individual will personally be affected by the threat.  Coping feasibility is the 
evaluation of ease or difficulty in implementing a threat mitigating action.  The model 
followed PMT premise where the protection motivation is influenced by the perception of 
threat and the available coping mechanisms.  Protection motivation refers to the desire 
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and willingness that directs activities (Floyd et al., 2000).  The model also shows that 
protection motivation is a predictor of secure behavior. 
 
Figure 3. Research conceptual model 
3.2 Threat Context 
Threat context is the circumstances faced by end-users that can expose or take 
advantage of the technical, administrative, or physical conditions to threaten the security 
information confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009).  Previous 
researchers have either focused on an implicit threat; thus, focusing on a specific solution 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Posey et al., 2013) or researchers have focused on an objective 
threat limiting the research generalizability (Chatterjee et al., 2015).  The consideration of 
threat context determines how any threat is perceived by the end-user.  This allows the 
research to be generalizable across different known threats, as well as applicable to new 
threats that may emerge in the future. 
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This research proposes that the threat is activated through perceptions in attitude. 
Thus, consistent with protection motivation theory, the present research argues, in a 
behavioral model, that threats are manifested as artifacts of attitudes.  Consequently, the 
proposed model is threat agnostic, i.e., the threat is generalizable across all objective 
threats.  This research argues that it is not the objective threat, but the perception of threat 
by the end user, that drives the behavior.  Thus, threat context is the basis of all other 
constructs in the model.  
3.3 Knowledge Mechanism Dimensions 
Knowledge is available to the organization as policies and training (Safa et al., 
2016).  Sanchez (1997) explained that knowledge is a multifaceted concept that provides 
a theoretical, strategic, and practical understanding of the available course of action.  
Such understanding clarifies how to perform an action, why an action provides certain 
results, and what the purpose of available course of action.  Sanchez also suggested that 
each facet of knowledge has specific purposes, requires distinct communication 
strategies, and may impact behavior differently.  Organizations aim to motivate 
employees with knowledge to maintain the state where security behavior is a natural 
behavior (Padayachee, 2012).  Knowledge mechanisms convey the latest security 
knowledge and technical skills (D'Arcy et al., 2014).  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the three independent dimensions of knowledge that impact employees’ abilities 
to perform a task are breadth, depth, and finesse (Munro et al., 1997).   
Information security literature addressed the positive impact of the 
comprehensiveness of knowledge mechanism on employees’ behaviors and suggested 
approaches to structure the contents of information security policy (Siponen & Iivari, 
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2006) and to provide effective information security training (Karjalainen & Siponen, 
2011).  These approaches focused on employees’ cognitive process (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010) to comprehend and learn about information security.  The aim is to enable every 
organization to motivate employees to a point where security behavior is a natural 
behavior (Padayachee, 2012).  Researchers have focused on understanding how 
individuals assess a topic of interest cognitively (Posey et al., 2013).  However, 
transforming security behavior goes beyond the communication and acquisition of 
knowledge and awareness of threats and security (Johnston et al., 2015).  Researchers 
advocated the need to address the gap between employees’ knowledge and behaviors or 
the “knowing-doing” gap (Burns et al., 2017).  Thus, we argue that despite the 
importance of cognition, behavioral drivers are affective.  This research clarifies the 
psychological impact of knowledge mechanisms across three dimensions: breadth, depth, 
and finesse.  
3.3.1 Breadth   
Knowledge breadth refers to the different knowledge across domains with which 
the firm is familiar (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996).  The breadth of knowledge is related to 
a broader set of tasks rather than steps of technical job requirements (Burns et al., 2017).  
Breadth is the horizontal dimension of knowledge (De Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2013).  
In the context of information security SETA and policies, knowledge breadth can be 
defined as the organizational broad understanding of wide range of diverse information 
security threats.  Information security require the coverage of wide range of 
organizational functions (Ashenden, 2008). 
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Protecting organizational information assets requires knowledge of wide range of 
threats and the corresponding mitigating actions (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  A policy 
articulates knowledge regarding general organizational rules and regulations to direct the 
behavior of subordinates (Knapp et al., 2009).  Further, training is the most pervasive 
method for communicating organizations’ goals (S. Gupta et al., 2010).  Researchers 
explained that policies can be designed to reflect a broad set of risks to organizational 
processes (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002) and training can provide information security 
knowledge that leads to comprehension and familiarity to manage security incidents 
(Safa et al., 2016).  Training has a significant impact on employees’ attitude change (S. 
Gupta et al., 2010).  Knowledge mechanisms can capture wide range of security 
requirements (Siponen, Baskerville, & Heikka, 2006) that leads to comprehension and 
familiarity (Safa et al., 2016) and increase awareness (D'Arcy et al., 2009) of security 
incidents and risks to information.  Training goals have skill-based goals for breadth of 
knowledge (S. Gupta et al., 2010).  Training provides theoretical principles that explain 
how and why training works and practical guidance for implementation (Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010).  Knowledge mechanisms are used to aid individuals to form the desired 
security perception (Tsohou et al., 2015).   
In contrast, the limited breadth of knowledge in training and policy reduces the 
end user’s abilities to recognize threats as well as understand their impact.  Researchers 
suggested that employees generally do not believe that their insecure behavior can make 
them subjected to information security threats (Vance et al., 2012).  A lack of knowledge 
can cause accidental security breaches and can also increase security threats (Warkentin 
et al., 2016) 
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Knowledge breadth can increase employees’ ability to distinguish between 
threats.  Breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms can associate employees’ daily 
assignments with various threat contexts or the circumstances that can exploit systems’ 
vulnerabilities and threaten the security of information.  Knowledge breadth helps form 
adequate evaluation and understanding regarding threats’ impact (Posey et al., 2015).  
This study argues that the breadth of knowledge can explain risks associated with wide 
range of security threats that users otherwise may think irrelevant to their daily 
responsibilities.  Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: The greater the breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the greater 
the un-desirability of threat by end-users.  
3.3.2 Depth 
Knowledge depth is the completeness of knowledge regarding a task that leads to 
the competency of performance (Munro et al., 1997).  Depth captures the vertical 
dimension of knowledge (De Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2013).  Knowledge depth is 
needed to address the complexity of knowledge across functional units (Galunic & 
Rodan, 1998).  Depth provides knowledge about the capabilities of a technology 
(Nambisan, Agarwal, & Tanniru, 1999) and the strategic understanding of the purpose of 
the available course of action (Sanchez, 1997).  In the context of information security, 
knowledge depth in knowledge mechanisms provide understanding of the complete steps 
needed to address any threat in a specific context.  It can enable efficient and effective 
approach to safeguard information assets (Safa et al., 2016).   
Literature shows that employees develop the desired attitude if they have the 
relevant expertise to implement the recommended security measures (Ifinedo, 2012).  In 
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order for employees to know how to perform any activity in a secure manner, employees 
would have to have sufficient knowledge to perform their tasks securely (Van Niekerk & 
Von Solms, 2010).  Researchers suggested that information security knowledge prevents 
duplication of efforts, thus saving time and money (Safa et al., 2016).  Literature shows 
that people mistakenly estimated more time on task when they had abstract knowledge 
which reduced task feasibility (Kanten, 2011).  Having an in-depth understanding about 
the available course of action will increase coping feasibility.   
Inadequate depth of information security knowledge is the leading cause of 
information security incidents created by employees (Safa et al., 2016).  Abstractness 
about an event has a detrimental effect on accuracy (Halamish, Borovoi, & Liberman, 
2017) which will increase the cost of the coping mechanism.  Complex security standards 
can be perceived as counterproductive (Herath & Rao, 2009b).  Lack of depth in 
knowledge mechanisms may lead employees to believe that all outcomes are 
predetermined and therefore, the threat impact is inevitable (Workman et al., 2008).  
Also, a lack of depth of knowledge may contribute to the perception of the conflict 
between business opportunities and security demands (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  
Researchers concluded that violations are justified by the perception of counterproductive 
security measures (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2015).  Lack of knowledge depth 
may cause performance delay that increases the cost of response and employees will be 
reluctant to comply (Anderson et al., 2016) and encourage employees to rationalize 
violations (Siponen & Vance, 2010).       
Researchers expressed that not only is it important for employees to be aware of 
security measures, but also they need to be able to successfully carry out these tasks 
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(Padayachee, 2012).  Employees need to maintain their productivity for security 
requirements to be feasible (Posey et al., 2015; Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  Knowledge 
depth can allow employees to perform their daily assignment while in compliance with 
the organization's security requirements (Chen et al., 2015).  The knowledge about 
feasible responses can have a positive impact on secure behavior (Warkentin et al., 2016).  
Security measures need to be perceived as viable to be followed (Padayachee, 2012).  
Therefore, this study argued that knowledge depth provides feasible approach to apply 
the available security recommendations.  Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: The greater the depth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the higher the 
coping feasibility.  
3.3.3 Finesse 
Finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness to the available course of action 
(Munro et al., 1997).  Finesse provides great operational value from insights and 
intuitions (B. Gupta, Iyer, & Aronson, 2000).  This knowledge dimension embodies 
creativity, self-sufficiency, and the ability to learn new things (Mills & Chin, 2007).  In 
the context of information security, finesse is the ability to follow creative approaches to 
mitigate a threat in a specific context.  Finesse allows the mining of employees’ insights 
and intuitions (B. Gupta et al., 2000).  Employees can be more motivated to adopt 
security practices if they have the skills and the experience (Padayachee, 2012). 
Finesse is a dimension of knowledge that has not been considered in the context 
of information security.  However, Studies have shown that having an innovative creative 
style is positively correlated with IT use (Gallivan, 2003).  Knowledge can be transferred 
through frequent advice from experts (Galunic & Rodan, 1998) or employees’ 
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collaboration (Safa et al., 2016).  Knowledge is personalized information possessed in the 
mind of individuals (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).  Therefore, finesse allows employees to 
collaborate and brainstorm to create feasible approaches to required tasks.  This is 
consistent with Nonaka, Byosiere, Borucki, and Konno (1994), that such approach 
improves competence and enhances performance.  Thus, we argue that finesse enables 
employees to increase the feasibility of security measures.  Hence, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: The greater the finesse, the higher the coping feasibility. 
3.4 Psychological Process 
Much of existing literature has focused on two psychological constructs – threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal.  However, as shown in chapter 2, the results from 
empirical studies have been inconsistent.  A key reason for this is the lack of 
personalization of the theory.  The premise of PMT is to motivate individuals to protect 
themselves from a specific personal threat (Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers, 1983).  The 
personal motivation is influenced by the perception of the presence of an effective 
response that individuals can perform to protect themselves from that threat (Floyd et al., 
2000).  However,  threats toward the organization instead of the person did not present 
accurately the intent of PMT, and as a result, this approach did not motivate individuals 
with consistency (Warkentin et al., 2016).  The analysis of prior research using PMT in 
information security context has confirmed varied and conflicting results for reasons 
other than natural variation or measurement error, suggesting that the conflicting results 
were due to the context of the application (Sommestad et al., 2015).  Researchers called 
for future research to address the inconsistent findings regarding the impact of each of 
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PMT constructs in the context of information security (Warkentin et al., 2016).  In order 
for PMT to create the desired protection motivation, the threat must be more concrete and 
related to the person and not to the person’s organization (Sommestad et al., 2015).  
Including the dimension of personal relevance is critical to preserve the original premise 
of PMT.  Therefore, the literature presents a need for a theoretically driven re-
conceptualization of PMT constructs to preserve its intent in the context of information 
security. 
3.4.1 Construal Level Theory 
Construal level theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2010) will be introduced in this 
section to provide means to measure the psychological constructs of PMT from an 
individual’s perspective, i.e., personalizing them.  CLT is appropriate to bring the 
original intent of PMT constructs to the context of information security to minimize 
results inconsistency regarding PMT constructs.  CLT explains the way individuals 
construct perception and the associated behavior regarding any particular event (Ho et al., 
2015; (Köhler, Breugelmans, & Dellaert, 2011).  The key concept behind the theory is the 
idea of “Construal”.  The psychological term “construal” refers to the individuals’ 
interpretation and perception of an event (construed by individuals) (Trope et al., 2007) 
to come up with a behavior choice.   
Individuals use construal process to construct egocentric reference point, called 
psychological distance, to all objects and events (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
Psychological distance is egocentric; its reference point is the self in the here and now, 
and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point constitute 
different distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  Psychological distance impacts the way 
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individuals perceive or construe the event (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  Events are 
construed with a higher level of abstraction as the psychological distance increases 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010).  By contrast, the decreased psychological distance between 
the individual and the event leads to lower level of construal that creates more detailed, 
concrete, and context-specific interpretation of the event (Trope et al., 2007).  CLT 
explains that the closer the psychological distance between individuals and an event, the 
more concrete the event will be construed.  On the other hand, as the psychological 
distance increases, the more abstract the event will become (Krishna, 2012; Trope et al., 
2007).   
CLT posits that psychological distance has several dimensions (Trope et al., 
2007): temporal (Liberman & Trope, 1998), spatial (Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2008), social (Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008), and hypothetical 
(Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006).  All four types of distance produced 
significant effects on construal level, supporting the central proposition of CLT that 
variation along any dimension of psychological distance will influence construal level, 
which means the degree of interpretation’s abstraction (Soderberg, Callahan, 
Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015).   
The temporal dimension is a time relevant dimension that explains the 
psychological distance for an event that is happening now compared to an event that will 
happen in the future (Liberman & Trope, 1998).  A spatial dimension is a place relevant 
dimension that explains the psychological distance for an event that will take place here 
compared to an event that will take place somewhere else (Fujita et al., 2008).  The social 
dimension is a people relevant dimension that explains the psychological distance for an 
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event that will impact the person’s own-self compared to an event that will impact others 
(Liviatan et al., 2008).  The hypothetical dimension is a probability relevant dimension 
that explains the psychological distance for an event that is more likely to happen 
compared to an event with remote possibilities of happening (Wakslak et al., 2006).  The 
probability of an event’s occurrence not only impacts the individual’s perception 
regarding the event, but it also can have significant implications on the decision and the 
course of actions regarding this event (Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007).  Dimensions 
such as time, place, people, and the probability of occurrence influence the psychological 
process of event interpretation.  Therefore, according to CLT, an event will be at a greater 
psychological distance when it is farther into the future, occurs in remote locations, less 
likely to occur, or affects other people (Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007). 
CTL explained that the detailed and physical presentation of the actual product, as 
opposed to being represented abstractly by a verbal brand name, directed consumers to 
have accurate judgment of the product (Krishna, 2012).  Increased psychological distance 
increased the desirability perception of the system’s ease of use and usefulness and 
increased adoption intention (Ho et al., 2015).  When CLT was applied to evaluate 
customers’ online reviews, results reflected that the increased distance and abstraction 
created more positive perception of the event and positive feedback (Huang, Burtch, 
Hong, & Polman, 2016).  In a CLT study focused on understanding the psychology of 
password management, researchers found that manipulating the psychological distance, 
such as time, can positively influence the tradeoff between security and convenience to 
influence individuals to follow secure behavior (Tam, Glassman, & Vandenwauver, 
2010). 
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A construal, in the context of information security is equivalent to a thereat 
context.  CLT suggests that the concreteness or abstractness of a construal as experienced 
by the individual governs their behavioral choice.  The key psychological constructs that 
capture these behavioral choices are desirability and feasibility.  These constructs are 
similar to the PMT constructs of threat appraisal and coping appraisal.  Liberman and 
Trope (1998), explained that the distinction between feasibility and desirability 
corresponds to the distinction between means and ends.  Desirability refers to the 
outcome, ends, or goals, whereas feasibility considerations explain action alternatives to 
achieve the desired outcome or goals.   
In this section, we outline the two new constructs based on CLT – threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility.  We compare and contrast these with existing 
conceptualization from PMT regarding threat appraisal and coping appraisal.  We also 
present arguments of how these fit into the model and why they in turn influence 
behavioral choice.  The application of CLT in the context of information security 
explains individuals’ psychological processes that influence the perception of the un-
desirability of a threat and the feasibility of the countermeasure in terms of personal 
psychological distance.   
3.4.2 Threat Un-desirability 
Threat un-desirability refers to the perception of the extent to which an individual 
will personally be affected by the threat.  Consistent with CLT primes, abstract 
knowledge about an event directs individual’s attention to the desirability of that event 
(Ho et al., 2015).  In the context of information security, the abstractness or concreteness 
of knowledge regarding information threats can be perceived in terms of threat un-
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desirability.  Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the threat appraisal from a 
personal un-desirability perspective (threat un-desirability).  While the evaluation of 
threat un-desirability sounds similar to the PMT construct of threat appraisal, which is the 
personal perception regarding the severity of and vulnerability to a threat (Rogers, 1983), 
it differs in three ways, as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Threat Appraisal Compared to Threat Un-Desirability 
 Threat Appraisal Threat un-Desirability 
Definition 
The individuals’ 
assessment of their own 
safety if they follow a 
certain risky behavior 
(Floyd et al., 2000) 
The extent to which an 
individual perceives the personal 
impact by the threat 
Locus Organization Individual - Threat 
Measuring what Magnitude Psychological distance 
Process Cognitive assessment Affective assessment  
 
As Table 5 shows, threat un-desirability differs from threat appraisal in three 
ways: locus, measures, and process.  The original context of PMT refers to threat 
appraisal as the individuals’ assessment of their own safety if they follow a certain 
behavior (Maddux & Rogers, 1983).  However, the locus of threat appraisal in 
information security research is how well an individual understands organizational threat 
(Warkentin et al., 2016).  The position of the threat was removed from a personal threat 
and became an organizational threat.  Threat un-desirability refers to the extent to which 
an individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat.  Therefore, threat un-
desirability’s locus is the individual.  
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Another difference between threat appraisal and threat un-desirability in the 
context of information security is the measure of threat impact.  The appraisal of 
information security threats measures the magnitude of damage towards the organization 
(Sommestad et al., 2015).  Threat un-desirability measures the perception of the threat 
based on psychological distance from the individual.  For example, people find it less 
desirable to share private information on a government website because the perception of 
exposure to a personal threat is greater (Crossler, 2010).  By contrast, violations against 
organizational information can be more desired if it leads to increased productivity 
(Siponen & Vance, 2010).     
The third difference between threat appraisal and threat un-desirability is the basis 
of the process of threat by the individual.  Threat appraisal is a process that influences the 
individual’s cognition regarding a specific threat to motivate protection (Sommestad et 
al., 2015).  However, as we argued earlier, despite the importance of cognition, 
behavioral drivers are affective.  Threat un-desirability is the affective assessment of the 
threat that motivates behavioral choice.     
Literature shows that the threat appraisal process is conceptualized through 
organizational threat.  Threats to the security of organizational information are broadly 
construed to mean modification, destruction, theft, or lack of availability of 
organizational computing assets and services (Straub & Welke, 1998).  That places 
abstractness to the threat and increases the psychological distance directing perception 
towards desirability (Krishna, 2012; Trope et al., 2007).  Lack of information security 
knowledge presents abstract perception of security threats which may lead an employee 
to believe that security violations are less harmful (Vance et al., 2012).  Literature 
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supports that complex security measures, which increase psychological distance from the 
employee, may increase violations’ desirability (D'Arcy et al., 2014).  People find it less 
desirable to share private information on a public website because the appraisal of threat 
is greater (Crossler, 2010).  However, the increase in productivity justifies violations 
against organizational information (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  Therefore, consistent with 
CLT propositions of psychological distance, PMT construct threat appraisal can be 
reframed on a personal level in terms of threat un-desirability.   
The appraisal of the threat is strongly related to protection motivation when the 
target of the threat is the person himself or herself but not someone else or the 
organization (Sommestad et al., 2015).  Therefore, consistent with CLT, the concrete 
perception of a threat and its severity brings this threat to a closer psychological distance 
to the individual increasing threat un-desirability and increasing protection motivation.  
Threat assessment will shape employees’ attitude towards compliance (Herath & Rao, 
2009b; Warkentin et al., 2016).  Individuals are more likely to follow protective behavior 
when the threat’s damaging impact is severe (Vance et al., 2012; Workman et al., 2008).  
Information security literature supports that severity of the threat and its harmful impact 
significantly affect employees’ concerns regarding security breaches (Chen et al., 2012; 
Herath & Rao, 2009b).  In the information security domain, PMT has been used in 
contexts where the threat is rather abstract (Sommestad et al., 2015) and vulnerability is 
explained to be towards the organizational information systems rather than the individual 
(Johnston et al., 2015).  Thus, employees may feel invulnerable to the threat.  Abstract 
perception of threats increases the personal psychological distance to the threat directing 
the individual perception to the desirability of the threat. 
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Employees may rationalize violations when threat is abstract (Siponen & Vance, 
2010).  The personal understanding of the damaging details of the threat will bring threat 
to a closer psychological distance, which will increase threat un-desirability.  Threat un-
desirability is the personal assessment of the damaging impact of the threat.  When 
threats are explained in more detail, threats become less desirable.  Therefore, with the 
decreased desirability of the threat, employees’ secure behavior can become a personal 
behavioral choice.  As threats become less desirable by the employee, the more motivated 
the employee can be to follow protective behavior.  Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation.  
3.4.3 Coping Feasibility 
Coping feasibility refers to the process by which individuals evaluate the 
effectiveness of the available risk mitigating behavior.  Individuals’ attitude is influenced 
by their evaluation of the feasibility of the response (Warkentin et al., 2016).  Feasibility 
consideration focuses on the level of difficulty regarding the action alternatives to 
achieve the desired outcome or goals.  CLT research supports that the increased 
knowledge regarding how to apply a recommended action directs individuals’ perception 
to feasibility of the action (Köhler et al., 2011).  As knowledge explains the details and 
the features of the coping mechanism, intentions will be focused on the feasibility (Ho et 
al., 2015).  Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the response appraisal from the 
feasibility perspective (response feasibility).  The difference between coping appraisal 
and coping feasibility is shown in Table 6.  
  55 
 
 
Table 6: Coping Appraisal Compared to Coping Feasibility 
 
Coping Appraisal  Coping Feasibility  
Definition 
The coping appraisal is the 
process by which individuals 
evaluate how effective, 
manageable, and feasible the 
available risk mitigating 
response can be (Ifinedo, 2012) 
Coping feasibility refers to an 
individual’s attitude towards 
the efficacy and difficulty of 
the individual action required 
to prevent / mitigate the threat 
Locus Task Individual - Action 
Measuring what Effectiveness and Skill Difficulty perception  
Basis Efficacy  Effort 
 
As Table 6 shows, coping feasibility differs from coping appraisal in three ways: 
locus, measures, and process.  The original intent of PMT posits that coping appraisal is 
the process by which individuals evaluate how effective, manageable, and feasible the 
available risk mitigating response can be (Ifinedo, 2012).  The locus of coping appraisal 
in the context of information security is the task to be performed by the individual.  
Coping feasibility is concerned with the individual’s perception of the ease (difficulty) in 
performing a successful mitigating action.  Therefore, the locus of coping feasibility is 
the individual. 
Another difference between coping appraisal and coping feasibility in the context 
of information security is what is being measured.  Coping appraisal is concerned with 
the availability of a coping mechanism and the ability to perform what is required to avert 
the threat (Floyd et al., 2000).  Coping feasibility is the process by which an individual’s 
attitude towards a recommended secure behavior is based on the perception of the degree 
of difficulty to follow that behavior.  This research argues in the model that the end user’s 
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perception of threat drives the behavior.  Therefore, it is relevant to measure the 
individual’s perception of the desired secure behavior, or response efficacy, and the 
degree of difficulty to follow that behavior, or response difficulty. 
Finally, the basis of the process of coping appraisal is the individuals’ belief in 
their ability to implement a certain prescribed coping mechanism.  Coping appraisal basis 
are self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response cost (Boss et al., 2015).  Coping 
feasibility is based on the individual’s perception of the adequacy of the mitigating 
action, response efficacy, and the associated efforts needed to implement successfully 
that available action, or response difficulty.     
Researcher found that the individuals perception of the available response has the 
most significant influence on forming intentions and behavior (Sommestad et al., 2015).  
Individuals’ belief in their own abilities to perform what is required to avert the threat can 
influence intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).  The positive perception is enabled by 
employees’ relevant knowledge, competence and capability to implement preventative 
security measures (Ifinedo, 2012).  Researchers have shown that the individual’s capacity 
to participate in an affordable threat mitigating action can positively influence intentions 
(Herath & Rao, 2009a; Sommestad et al., 2015).  When organizations engage people to 
implement protective actions that they actually can take, they are more motivated for 
protection (Warkentin et al., 2016).  Information security literature suggests the positive 
impact of the feasibility of response on employees’ intentions (Johnston et al., 2015; 
Warkentin et al., 2016).  The literature suggests that when the desired response is clear 
and not abstract, protection motivation increases (Sommestad et al., 2015), and that is 
consistent with CLT, as details direct perception to feasibility (Ho et al., 2015). 
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Interestingly, researchers found that the increased complexity and difficulty of the 
desired protective response had a negative impact on protection motivation (D'Arcy et al., 
2014).  Hindrance to employees’ productivity caused by security requirements is one of 
the reasons for employees to neglect the recommended behavior (Herath & Rao, 2009b).  
Employees may actually feel justified not to follow secure behavior if it is perceived to 
be convoluted and gets in the way of their productivity (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  The 
increased cost of secure behavior can have a negative impact on protection motivation 
(Herath & Rao, 2009b).  Research findings suggest that if the response is not feasible, 
employees may not follow it.   
Coping feasibility is the personal assessment of response efficacy and the 
difficulty to follow that response.  As researchers suggested, based on the original intents 
of PMT, as the coping feasibility increases, the protection motivation also increases.  
Furthermore, as the complexity of the coping mechanisms decreases, the protection 
motivation increases.  Therefore, we argue that the increased coping feasibility can 
positively impact the individual’s motivation to follow a secure behavior.  Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.  
3.5 Secure Behavior 
The primary focus of PMT is to predict intentions toward protection motivation 
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983).  Researchers argued that PMT was successfully extended to 
predict behavior and not just the motivation because there is a link to actual behavior 
(Floyd et al., 2000).  The goal is not just to motivate employees but also to change their 
behavior.  PMT can be applied to measure actual behavior (Crossler et al., 2013).  
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Protection motivation, similar to other types of motivation, reflects the level of desire and 
willingness that directs behavior (Floyd et al., 2000).  Researchers argued that protection 
motivation is the strongest predictor of behavioral change (Boss et al., 2015).  Thus, 
although the independent variable in this research is protection motivation, this 
independent variable can be used as a proxy to predict the actual secure behavior.   
Prior research efforts demonstrated a clear linkage between intention and actual 
behavior (Johnston et al., 2015).  This approach is supported by numerous empirical 
research studies because the intention is viewed to be an indication of a precondition to a 
behavioral act (Siponen et al., 2014).  Compliance intention is an antecedent and a strong 
predictor of actual behavior (Sommestad & Hallberg, 2013).   
3.6 Chapter Summary 
The theoretical development presented in this chapter builds on the gaps and 
findings synthesized from the reviewed literature.  The model conceptualizes 
organizational knowledge mechanisms, training and policy, across three dimensions: 
breadth, depth, and finesse to explain how any threat is perceived by the end-user.  The 
proposed model is threat agnostic.  This allows the research to be generalizable across 
different known threats as well as new threats that may emerge.  Knowledge breadth 
connects wide range of threats that the organization may face to increase employees’ 
ability to distinguish between threats that users otherwise may think irrelevant.  
Knowledge depth presents the completeness of knowledge in order for employees to 
know how to perform any activity.  Finesse is the ability to apply innovativeness through 
collaboration and brainstorming to create feasible approaches to enhance performance 
and increase the feasibility of secure behaviors.  
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The model follows PMT to explain the psychological process of protection 
motivation that is influenced by the personal perception of threat and the available coping 
mechanisms.  In the context of information security, PMT showed inconsistent results 
due to lack of personalization as threats toward organizations instead of the person did 
not accurately present the intent of PMT.  CLT provides a means to measure the 
psychological constructs of PMT from an individual’s perspective, i.e., personalizing 
them.  CLT explains that abstract knowledge about an event directs individual’s 
perception to the desirability of that event, whereas detailed knowledge directs the 
perception towards feasibility.  Therefore, it is relevant to re-conceptualize the PMT 
constructs (threat appraisal and coping appraisal) from a personal perspective as threat 
un-desirability and coping feasibility.  Threat un-desirability focuses on the individual’s 
perception of a personal impact by the threat.  Consistent with CLT, when threats are 
explained in more details, threats become less desirable and with the decreased 
desirability of the threat, employees’ secure behavior can become a personal behavioral 
choice.  Similarly, coping feasibility focuses the personal perception on the level of 
difficulty regarding the action alternatives to achieve the desired secure behavior.  The 
increased feasibility of the mitigating action can positively impact the individual’s 
motivation to follow a secure behavior.  PMT was successfully extended to predict 
behavior and not just the motivation.  Literature supports that protection motivation is an 
antecedent and a strong predictor of actual behavior.  Therefore, the presented dependent 
variable in this model, protection motivation, should be capable of predicting secure 





CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter presents the quantitative research design used to test the research 
model and to examine the relationships between variables in order to answer the research 
questions.  The methodological approach proposed in this chapter followed a two-study 
approach to answer both research questions: 
Q1: What are the key psychological processes that influence employees’ secure 
behavior when dealing with an information security threat? 
Q2: How do organizational knowledge mechanisms such as SETA programs and 
policies influence key psychological processes of threat perception? 
Study one is an experiment designed to answer the first research question.  In 
many research studies, experimental models are used when a convenience sample is 
possible with naturally formed groups such as students in a classroom (Creswell, 2014).  
Study two evaluates the entire research model, thus answering both research questions.  
Study two employs a quantitative survey design.  The data is collected online from a 
sample of full-time working professionals.  The survey assesses the relationships between 
the input constructs (knowledge dimensions), process constructs (threat un-desirability 
and coping feasibility), and the output construct (protection motivation).  The proposed 






The following sections will explain each of the two studies.  The sections will 
address the design, constructs involved, samples used, procedures, and data collection 
methods.  The concluding section will summarize studies conducted.  
4.1 Study One 
The first research question aims to understand the key psychological processes of 
threat perception.  To answer this question, the focus was on a subset of the research 
model.  The entire research model was investigated in study two.  Study one research 
model is shown in Figure 4.    
 
Figure 4. Study one model diagram 
Study one measures how the concreteness or abstractness of a threat context 
impacts the participants’ affective perception of that threat’s un-desirability and coping 
feasibility.  Therefore, in study one, a known threat context is manipulated and presented 
to participants with either concreteness or in a high level of abstraction.  This scenario 
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manipulation allows the researchers to measure the impact of the key constructs of the 
psychological process, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, on protection 
motivation.     
4.1.1 Research Method 
To empirically validate the manipulation checks for these key psychological 
processes, this study applies a valid and operationalizable scenario-based, experimental 
research design.  The intent of the experimental design is to test the impact of a treatment 
on the outcome (Creswell, 2014).  In study one, the treatment is a scenario-based 
manipulation of the degree of abstractness or concreteness of a known threat context to 
measuring the impact on protection motivation.  Using a scenario-based experiment 
allows the researcher to establish a reliable and valid measure for behavioral intention as 
it relates to the various factors found in the scenario (Willison, Warkentin, & Johnston, 
2018).  The use of experimental methods offer a high internal validity and allows for 
statistical controls (S. Gupta, 2006). The direct comparison of effects, while controlling 
other factors that might offer competing explanations, as well as the replications of the 
phenomenon provide high internal validity (Poole & DeSanctis, 2004).  However, cross 
sectional studies do not account for maturation or history of participants or threats 
therefore they are limited in longitudinal generalization.  
The experiment applies a scenario-based survey to validate empirically the 
instrument to measure the impact of these manipulations on protection motivation.  Using 
a scenario-based analysis has been established and applied to IS research (Willison et al., 
2018).  This experiment is designed based on previous literature recommendations 
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(Campbell & Stanley, 1963, p. 50).  In this design, the experimental control is achieved 
or enhanced by entering all groups into all manipulations.   
4.1.2 Sample 
The selected sample frame used for this experiment was undergraduate students 
enrolled in various business programs from a university in southeast region of the United 
States of America.  This sample frame is appropriate because business students represent 
a sample of information systems end users who have valuable information that should be 
protected.  Information systems literature shows that the use of students in information 
systems research is a common practice (Chatterjee et al., 2015).  In the specific context of 
information security, Warkentin et al. (2016), supported the use of students as a reliable 
sampling frame for two reasons.  First, students are members of an organization that 
requires information security compliance.  Also, students are individuals with valuable 
informational assets, and therefore, they are subject to protection motivation factors as 
any system user.  Therefore, the university business students present an adequate and 
relevant sample to evaluate factors impacting the perception of threat un-desirability and 
coping feasibility.   
Participants were invited to participate in the experiment on a voluntary basis.  All 
participating students received course credit.  As this study focused on the psychological 
perception of knowledge workers, end-users, students majoring in Information Systems 
or Information Security were not included in the sample, as these students may not 
represent the typical end users.  Also, they may represent perceptions influenced by prior 
experiences with security breaches.  Some researchers addressed the positive relationship 
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between prior experiences with security incidents and protection motivation (Boss et al., 
2015; D. Lee et al., 2008). 
 The determination of sample size impacts the power analysis (Hair, Black, Babin, 
& Anderson, 2010, p. 174).  As explained in Creswell (2014, p. 169), for experimental 
research, researchers use power analysis to identify the appropriate sample size for the 
groups.  Researchers set values for three factors involved in the calculations of the 
sample size (alpha = 0.05, power = 0.80, and effect size = 0.5).  As shown in the sample 
size table, Cohen (1988, p. 54), the appropriate sample size according to these three 
values is 50 participants for each group. This is also consistent with Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, and Tatham (1998), as they stated a rule of thumb to require at least sample of 
50 to maintain power at 0.80.  G*Power software was also used to calculate the needed 
sample size.  The calculated sample size by the software was consistent with the literature 
recommendation.  Therefore, our target sample size for each group was 65 participants to 
account for unusable responses.    
4.1.3 Experimental Procedure Manipulation  
Following the Campbell and Stanley (1963) design, the experiment was applied in 
a randomized manner, as illustrated in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5. Experiment design diagram 
RG1 XC1 O XA1 O 
RG2  XA2 O XC2 O 
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The design contains three classifications: RG is the random group, X is the 
manipulation, and O is the observation.  Each treatment occurred once (XC denotes the 
manipulations based on a concrete scenario, and XA denotes the manipulations based on 
an abstract scenario).  The subscript numbers in the diagram represents whether group 1 
or group 2.  
Students were randomly split into two groups, RG1 and RG2 as denoted in the 
diagram in Figure 5, to enhance external validity.  Creswell (2014, p. 158) recommended 
randomization to increase the ability to generalize to a population.  For the random group 
assignments, the randomization feature in Qualtrics Research Suite software was applied.  
Qualtrics software allows the researcher to evenly and randomly split participants into 
two groups based on a specified branching condition.  In this experiment, the branching 
condition was either group 1 or group 2.  This option automatically assigned each student 
randomly to be placed in one of the two groups and see only the part of the survey 
assigned to that group.  
Each group received a one pair of scenarios (an abstract scenario and a concrete 
scenario) for a specific security threat context to work with.  All participants in group 1 
received the concrete version of scenario 1 (Xc1), while at the same time, all participants 
in group 2 received the abstract version of scenario 2 (XA2).  The scenarios were 
presented as animated short videos to both groups.  The use of animation allows more 
control over the time needed to understand the scenarios.  After watching the animated 
videos, students recorded their observations. For the observations, students were given 
scales that measured their perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  
When all scenario observations were recorded for both groups, the same process was 
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repeated; however, group 1 received the abstract version of scenario 1 (XA1) while group 
2 received the concrete version of scenario 2 (XC2).   
It is argued here that the concrete description of a scenario, according to CLT, 
will construe the threat on a closer psychological distance from the participant directing 
their perception to the coping feasibility and increasing threat un-desirability.  Also, the 
abstract scenario will construe the threat on a high psychological distance that will 
decrease the perception of threat un-desirability and reduce the perception of coping 
feasibility.  The psychological distance was manipulated across the following distance 
dimensions:   
 Temporal was measured by past, current, or future  
 Spatial was measured by a nearby location compared to somewhere else 
 Social was measured by events happening to self, known people, or random 
people  
 Hypothetical was measured by true situations or imaginary activities  
By manipulating the degree of abstractness or concreteness, the individual’s protection 
motivation will be impacted through threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  Hence, 
we developed the following hypotheses, as explained in the previous chapter and 
presented in the model, regarding threat un-desirability and coping feasibility:  
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation 
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.  
To increase the contextual relevance, as explained by Siponen and Vance (2014), 
the scenarios clearly described the participant’s setting, environment, and the event that 
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the participant was thinking about and had worked with.  Each participant was asked to 
watch the scenarios and then respond to an online scenario-based survey instrument.  The 
instrument measured threat un-desirability and coping feasibility perception among 
participants.  See Appendix B for complete details regarding both scenarios, including the 
concrete and abstract written versions and the manipulation checks.  The full instrument 
used for study one is included in Appendix C.  
4.1.4 Measurements 
As explained in the previous chapter, threat un-desirability refers to the extent to 
which an individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat.  This was measured by 
the individual’s psychological distance from a specific threat context.  The experiment 
manipulated all four dimensions of psychological distance based on CLT.  On the other 
hand, coping feasibility is concerned with the individual’s attitude towards the mitigating 
action and the perception of the ease or difficulty in performing that threat mitigating 
action.  This was measured by the individual’s perception of response efficacy and 
difficulty.  The experiment was used to manipulate participant’s perception of the ease or 
difficulty to perform the desired coping mechanism.  The dependent variable was 
protection motivation. 
The scenarios described above were presented to the participants to measure their 
perceptions of threat un-desirability.  After dealing with each threat scenario, participants 
were asked to rate their perceptions that reflected their own psychological distance from 
this threat context. Table 7 includes the psychological distance rating. 
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Table 7: Psychological Distance Rating 
I believe that the risk from the threat is 
Distant/Future impact 1-7 scale Imminent impact 
General/Generic 1-7 scale Personal 
Made-up/Hypothetical 1-7 scale Real 
Far away/Somewhere else 1-7 scale Close/Here 
 
Coping feasibility was measured by evaluating the participants’ perception of 
response efficacy and response difficulty.  The participants’ perception of coping 
feasibility was manipulated by the threat scenarios described above.  Coping feasibility is 
a higher order construct that was measured by two formative constructs, response 
efficacy and response difficulty.  The scale that measured response difficulty was adopted 
from S. Gupta (2006) (α = 0.946) and the scale that measured response efficacy was 
adopted from Workman et al. (2008) (α = 0.85).  The instruments adopted were slightly 
modified to better match the specific context of this research.  On a scale from 1-7, where 
1 is strongly disagree and 7 is strongly agree, participants were asked to rate their own 
agreement with the coping feasibility questions. Table 8 shows the modified questions 
used in this research based on the original instruments by S. Gupta (2006) and Workman 
et al. (2008).  
Table 8: Coping Feasibility Instrument 
Coping feasibility 
Response Difficulty from S. Gupta (2006) α = 0.946 
Modified Instrument 
 Protecting myself from this threat complicates my job tasks  
 Protecting myself from this threat will make my current job mentally 
demanding  
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 Protecting myself from this threat requires a lot of thought and problem-solving 
in my current job 
Response Efficacy from Workman et al. (2008) (α = 0.85) 
Modified Instrument 
 Solutions available to keep my organization’s information / information 
systems safe from the threat are successful 
 The available measures that I can take to protect my organization’s information 
/ information systems from the threat are effective 
 The preventive measures available to me to stop the threat are adequate 
 
Finally, to measure protection motivation, the items below were adopted from 
Posey et al. (2015) with α = 0.64.  On a scale from 1-7 where 1 is strongly disagree and 7 
is strongly agree, participants were asked how motivated they are to take immediate 
action by rating the following: 
1. I will protect myself from this specific threat 
2. I will engage in activities to protect myself from this specific threat 
3. I will prevent this specific security threat from being successful 
4.1.5 Process and Statistical Control 
It is important to identify factors that may interfere with outcomes and provide 
false positives. Controls are introduced to eliminate any external influence.  Controlling 
for factors that may interfere with the outcome is critical so that participation in one 
group or the other will not impact the outcome (Creswell, 2014).  Controlling for factors 
that might offer competing external explanations leads to a clearer analysis of the impact 
of psychological manipulation on the output behavior, which in this case was protection 
motivation.  Through the use of experimental controls, it is possible to access perception 
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and the impacts on protection motivation without the confounding factors present in real 
settings. 
In this study we statistically controlled for the demographic of the sample such as 
gender, age, and computer experience.  These controls are commonly used in information 
security behavioral research (Boss et al., 2015; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 
2009b).  We also proposed to statistically control for risk appetite.  Risk appetite or risk 
propensity is defined as an individual’s tendency to take or avoid riskier decisions (Sitkin 
& Weingart, 1995).  Therefore, we statistically controlled for participants’ risk 
propensity.  The five-item scale (α = .86) from research by Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
was used to measure risk propensity.  The five-item scale is shown in Appendix A.   
As part of study one, prior to conducting the survey, an expert panel comprising 
of four experts in research design and instrument development reviewed each scenario to 
ensure realistic scenario contents and validate the presence of all psychological distance 
dimensions.  Following the panel’s recommendations, minor changes were applied to the 
survey, such as word modifications. 
4.1.6 Analysis 
To assess the consistency and reliability of the scale measuring threat un-
desirability, a paired t-test method was used.  Paired t-tests are used to determine the 
difference in mean responses among groups (Hendrickson, Massey, & Cronan, 1993).  
Also, to further increase the external validity of the manipulations, the experiment used 
concrete and abstract versions of two threat scenarios to present a more realistic and 
generalizable assessment of psychological process output that would be applicable in any 
professional organization.  In the meantime, the partial least squares (PLS) statistical 
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analysis was performed to measure the relationship between independent variables (threat 
un-desirability and coping feasibility) and the dependent variable protection motivation.  
This approach has been established in business research (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). 
Descriptive statistics such as age, gender, degree level, major, and computer use 
was provided to explain the structure of the participants.  Manipulation checks were 
designed to measure the variability in perception based on the psychological distance 
changes.  To see the difference in perceptions, the measurement and the structural 
components of the model used for study one were tested using paired t-test and a path 
analysis modeling SEM technique.  The component-based partial least squares (PLS) 
approach was used to evaluate the model proposed in study one. 
4.2 Study Two 
The objective of study two is to test the entire research model.  The second 
research question aims to understand the way organizational knowledge mechanisms 
such as SETA programs and policy influence key psychological processes of threat 
perception.  To answer this question, study two evaluated the entire research model as 
shown in Figure 6.   




Figure 6. Research model 
The model represents the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and 
finesse) on protection motivation, while fully mediated by the individual’s affective 
perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  The model created, in a form 
of input-process-output, is suitable for analysis based on the hypothesized relationships.  
The following hypotheses that were explained in the previous chapter was tested: 
H1: The greater the breadth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the greater 
the un-desirability of threat by end-users.  
H2: The greater the depth of knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the higher the 
coping feasibility.  
H3: The greater the finesse, the higher the coping feasibility. 
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, the higher the protection motivation.  
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the higher the protection motivation.  
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4.2. 1 Research Methods 
Study two implemented a web-based survey design for data collection.  Survey 
design enables a generalizable quantitative description of the targeted population’s 
attitudes (Creswell, 2014).  Online surveys provide several advantages, such as economy, 
speed of return, error checking, a computer assisted instrument, time to provide 
thoughtful answers, anonymity, and a far reaching geographical distribution (Fowler Jr, 
2013).  Web-based surveys have been previously used in similar research to enable data 
collection from a large sample of business professionals (Crossler, 2010).   
A holistic approach, considering critical aspects for survey process, was followed 
as explained in the literature.  It is critical to consider the basic steps in survey process, 
such as defined objectives, population and sample frame, data collection strategy, time, 
budget, resources constraints, the questionnaire creation, data collection, and data 
analysis (Sue & Ritter, 2007).  The survey is cross-sectional, with the data collected at 
one point of time from business professionals.  Participants were asked to complete the 
online questionnaire while imagining themselves facing a context of a real information 
security threat.  To reduce problems with the reliability and validity of questionnaire, 
whenever possible, we adopted the items from previously validated studies.  Using 
validated and tested questions improves the reliability of results (Straub, 1989). 
4.2.2. Sample 
A key requirement for a high quality sample is representativeness of the 
population of interest (Hair et al., 2010, p. 523).  Selecting the appropriate representative 
sample provides the ability to generalize to the population (Creswell, 2014, p. 158).  The 
survey was sent out to a diverse sample of business professionals for data collection.  As 
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this study aims to understand end-user psychological perception regarding information 
security threats, the data were collected from a random sample of full-time business 
professionals who use information systems for their daily jobs. The sample did not 
include unemployed, retired professionals, or labor workers who do not use enterprise 
information systems daily to accomplish their job related tasks.  Because this sample may 
not reflect the end user’s psychological perception regarding information security threats.  
Also, IT professionals were excluded from the sample, as their prior experiences may 
influence their motivation to protect information (Boss et al., 2015; D. Lee et al., 2008).   
Based on the set of factors explained by Hair et al. (2010, p. 644), the minimum 
sample size used for this study should be 150 participants.  However, to account for the 
missing data and unusable responses, more than 200 responses were collected to ensure 
an adequate sample size that can be used for the data analysis process.  The sample 
included males, females, full-time employees, senior experienced professionals, and 
junior professionals in organizations within the Unites States.  The data that was collected 
targeted an evenly distributed sample of employees in terms of age, gender, employment 
type, and work location.  Such heterogeneity of the data sample supports 
representativeness for the targeted population and reduces potential bias arising from a 
limited employee representation in the data collection process.  
4.2.3 Measurements 
 Validated measuring scales were used in this study.  The survey adapted items 
used by Zhou and Li (2012) to measure knowledge breadth and knowledge depth.  The 
survey included three questions for items measuring knowledge breadth (α = 0.84) and 
three questions for items measuring knowledge depth (α = 0.78).  Also, the survey 
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included adapt items used by Munro et al. (1997) to measure finesse.  A slight 
modification of the instrument was applied to better align the instrument to the specific 
context of information security.  Table 9 shows the modified instrument used in this 
research to measure knowledge dimensions.  
Table 9: Knowledge Dimensions Items 
Knowledge Breadth (α = 0.84) by Zhou and Li (2012) 
Modified Instrument 
My organization's information security policies and training programs help me:  
 Acquire diversified and wide-ranging security knowledge 
 Accumulate knowledge of multiple security threats 
 Gain variety of technical knowledge about information security 
Knowledge Depth (α = 0.78) by Zhou and Li (2012) 
Modified Instrument 
My organization's information security policies and training programs give me:  
 Thorough understanding and experience of specific security threats 
 In-depth knowledge of the key information security threats that we face 
 Technical skills to mitigate specific threats targeting my domain of work 
Finesse (α = 0.78) by Zhou and Li (2012)  
Modified Instrument 
My organization's information security policies and training programs allow me to:  
 Leads to new solutions to replace older threat mitigating actions 
Knowledge Finesse Munro et al. (1997) 
Modified Instrument 
My organization's information security policies and training programs allow me to: 
 Apply my experience innovatively to face new and different security threats 
 Be creative to solve security problems at work 
 
The same items used in study one were also used in this study to measure threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility constructs.  Finally, protection motivation, as explained 
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earlier, was be measured by three items.  Please refer to Appendix A for full details 
regarding items measuring protection motivation.  
All constructs were measured formatively with multiple items on a seven-point 
Likert scales.  Table 10 presents a summary of all used constructs in study two.  The full 
instrument used to measure study two constructs is included in Appendix C.  
Table 10: Constructs Summary 
Construct α Cited 
Knowledge Breadth 0.84 Zhou and Li (2012) 
Knowledge Depth 0.78 Zhou and Li (2012) 
Knowledge Finesse NA Munro et al. (1997) 
Threat un-Desirability NA Authors 
Coping Feasibility: Response Difficulty 0.946 (S. Gupta, 2006) 
Coping Feasibility: Response Efficacy 0.85 Workman et al. (2008) 
Protection Motivation 0.64 Posey et al. (2015) 
Protection Motivation 0.983 Johnston et al. (2018) 
Risk Propensity (statistical control) 0.86 Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
 
4.2.4 Process and Statistical Controls 
Data were collected using online survey.  The online survey was designed and 
completed using Qualtrics Research Suite software.  A professional company was 
contracted for the recruitment of participants and the administration of the online survey.  
The benefits of using professional survey provider was extensively discussed in the 
literature (Creswell, 2014; Sue & Ritter, 2007).  Similar to study one, study two 
statistically controlled for the demographic of the sample, such as gender, age, computer 
experience.  These controls are commonly used in information security behavioral 
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research (Boss et al., 2015; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b).  This study also 
controlled for risk appetite, as it impacts individuals’ tendency to make risker decisions 
(Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).  Therefore, risk propensity was measured in this study.   
 Participants were asked to imagine themselves facing a particular known 
information security threat and imagine their own actions while completing the survey 
questions.  The survey was based on the items explained earlier.  Based on the analysis of 
all responses, the incomplete, missing, or unreliable responses were discarded.   
4.2.5 Hypothesis and Data Analysis 
Knowledge breadth represents the broad understanding of wide range of diverse 
information security threats.  Three reflective indicator items measured knowledge 
breadth.  This study proposes a positive impact of knowledge breadth on the un-
desirability of threat by end-users.  Knowledge depth represents complete understanding 
of steps needed to address any threat in a specific context.  Three reflective indicator 
items measured knowledge depth.  This study proposes a positive impact of knowledge 
depth on the coping feasibility.  Finesse is the ability to creativeness and innovativeness 
to the available course of action.  Five reflective indicator items measured finesse.  This 
study proposes a positive impact of finesse on the coping feasibility.   
The measurement and the structural components of the entire model was tested 
using SEM technique.  SEM is an appropriate statistical approach to examine the 
relationships of the entire theoretical model (Hair et al., 2010).  While SEM is a general 
term encompassing a variety of statistical models, the theoretical model proposed in this 
study will be tested using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM).  
The PLS-SEM is the preferred method when the objective is prediction of structural 
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relationships (Hair et al., 2011).  PLS-SEM is increasingly applied approach to examine 
structural equation (Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, & Mena, 2012).  The use of PLS-SEM is an 
appropriate approach as it has the ability to handle sample size issues better.  It also can 
handle complex theoretical models, such as the proposed model in this study and provide 
accurate estimates.  Smart-PLS software package was used for the data analysis.   
The demographic characteristics of the participants were reported.  Descriptive 
statistics of the participants, such as age, gender, education level, work experience, work 
division or department, and computer experience was provided to explain the structure of 
the participants.  The five item scale for risk propensity, adapted from Sitkin and 
Weingart (1995), were also used as a control variable.   
As recommended by Hair et al. (2011), construct reliability and validity must be 
considered to guarantee an accurate measurement of the constructs used.  Accordingly, 
the quality of the constructs was assessed by examining the factor loading for internal 
validity and Cronbach’s alpha for reliability.  Factors show small Cronbach alpha 
indicating low correlation between items.  The calculated Cronbach’s Alpha and 
Composite Reliability should show scale reliability and internal consistency of constructs 
in the model with all values above 0.7.  Reliability is the measure of how highly 
interrelated the items or indicators that measure the construct with each other to reflect 
that all indicators actually measure the same thing.  High reliability is associated with low 
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CHAPTER 5 – DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter focuses on the data analysis conducted to empirically validate the 
relationships between variables in the proposed model.  First, we discuss study one and 
associated statistical controls, as well as constructs validity and reliability.  The study 
focused on the subset of the entire model that addresses the impact of the perception of 
threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation.  Study one also 
includes comparative analysis to compare the traditional PMT model to the model 
presented by this research.  Following study one data analysis, we will discuss study two 
and evaluate the results to test each hypothesis.  Finally, we provide findings and results 
for each of the hypotheses tested.  The following sections below explain the details of the 
data analysis process. 
5.1 Study One Data Analysis 
Study one is an experiment designed to measure how concreteness or abstractness 
of a threat context influences the participants’ affective perception of that threat’s un-
desirability and coping feasibility.  In this experiment, a certain threat context was 
manipulated and presented to participants with either concreteness or in a high level of 
abstraction. 
5.1.1 Sample Frame and Used Sample  
The selected sample frame for study one was undergraduate students enrolled in 
various business major programs from a university in southeast region of the United 
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States of America.  Students were invited to voluntarily participate in the study.  
Instructors of several business classes announced to their students that they would receive 
an anonymous web link to the survey and encouraged them to participate. 
The survey link was shared with 457 students enrolled in various business classes.  
From the total students received the link, 314 students participated in the survey.  The 
response rate was 68.7%.  Survey responses were inspected for completeness and 
accuracy.  Consequently, 36 incomplete responses were removed.  An additional 16 
responses from computer science and information systems students were removed. The 
total number of responses used in the data analysis was 262 responses, 57.3% of the 
sample frame.   
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The 262 responses utilized included 49.2% females, 50.0% males, and 0.8% 
preferred not to disclose.  For the majority of respondents, 95.0%, were between 18 and 
30 years old.  Students from all four academic classes participated in the survey, 
including 8.8% freshmen, 32.4% sophomores, 27.5% juniors, and 31.3% seniors.  The 
262 participants were split evenly and randomly into two groups using Qualtrics, the 
online research software.  Each group included 131 participants and had a balanced 
demographic distribution.  Both groups one and two each received one pair of scenarios 
(an abstract scenario and a concrete scenario) for two specific threat contexts to work 
with.   
This study considered several control factors that could influence participants’ 
protection motivation such as participants’ age, gender, academic class, major, computer 
experience, and risk appetite.  These control variables were included in the data analysis 
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to account for the influence of these variables on protection motivation.  An independent 
sample t-test was conducted to compare means of all of the statistical control variables, 
gender, age, academic class, academic major, computer experience, and risk appetite.  
The analysis of the results of the independent sample t-test regarding all experimental 
control variables showed no significance in the difference between the two groups for all 
statistical control variables.  Table 11 shows the detailed results of the independent 
sample t-test for all the experimental/statistical controls.   










Computer Experience 3.01 (.72) 3.07(.81) -.06 .52 
Risk Appetite 2.87(.96) 2.94 (1.06) -.07 .58 
Gender 1.54 (.54) 1.48 (.50) .057 .377 
Age 2.35 (.67) 2.33 (.66) .023 .780 
Class 2.82 (.98) 2.81 (.98) .008 .950 
Major 6.21 (1.93) 6.47 (1.83) -.260 .265 
*p < 0.05; 
As the results show in Table 11, there was no significant difference between 
groups.  The automated randomization process for groups was successful, and the 
analysis concluded that both groups were equal.  Consequently, these statistical controls 
were dropped from any further analysis of results in study one.  
5.1.3 Construct Validity and Reliability 
The next step was performed to test the construct validity and reliability of the 
key measures used in this study – threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection 
motivation.  The proposed measures for threat un-desirability are the four dimensions of 
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the psychological distance forming the threat un-desirability higher order construct.  The 
four dimensions are temporal (TUDPD-Temp), social (TUDPD-Soci), spatial (TUDPD-
Spat), and hypothetical (TUDPD-Hypo).  Three items labeled TUDPD-Temp1, TUDPD-
Temp2, and TUDPD-Temp3 measured the temporal dimension.  The social dimension 
was measure by three items labeled TUDPD-Soci1, TUDPD-Soci2, and TUDPD-Soci3.  
The spatial dimension was measure by three items labeled TUDPD-Spat1, TUDPD-
Spat2, and TUDPD-Spat3.  The hypothetical dimension was measure by three items 
labeled TUDPD-Hypo1, TUDPD-Hypo2, and TUDPD-Hypo3.  The measures for higher 
order coping feasibility construct are the two formative constructs, response difficulty 
(RD) and response efficacy (RE).  The response difficulty construct was measured by 
three items (RD1, RD2, RD3) and the response efficacy construct was measured by three 
items (RE1, RE2, RE3).  Finally, the protection motivation construct was measured by 
five items (PM1, PM2, PM3, PM4, PM5).   
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm first order 
constructs.   Software used was Smart-PLS version 3 (Ringle, 2015).  The procedures 
used were partial least squares (PLS) and PLS bootstrapping (5000 runs).  The outer 
loadings were analyzed for all items measuring the proposed constructs.  Table 12 shows 
the outer loadings results for all items.  








PM1 <- PM 0.82* 44.12 0.00 
PM2 <- PM 0.86* 51.88 0.00 
PM3 <- PM 0.87* 69.17 0.00 
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PM4 <- PM 0.44* 8.20 0.00 
PM5 <- PM 0.85* 53.46 0.00 
RD1 <- RD 0.93* 1.92 0.03 
RD2 <- RD 0.94* 1.92 0.03 
RD3 <- RD 0.89* 1.93 0.03 
RE1 <- RE 0.90* 24.16 0.00 
RE2 <- RE 0.93* 24.62 0.00 
RE3 <- RE 0.88* 22.42 0.00 
TUDPDHypo1 <- Hypo 0.87* 60.34 0.00 
TUDPDHypo2 <- Hypo 0.86* 61.87 0.00 
TUDPDHypo3 <- Hypo 0.01 0.13 0.45 
TUDPDSoci1 <- Soci 0.82* 49.41 0.00 
TUDPDSoci2 <- Soci 0.74* 23.55 0.00 
TUDPDSoci3 <- Soci 0.88* 75.25 0.00 
TUDPDSpat1 <- Spat 0.12 1.42 0.08 
TUDPDSpat2 <- Spat 0.88* 86.89 0.00 
TUDPDSpat3 <- Spat 0.86* 59.25 0.00 
TUDPDTemp1 <- Temp 0.82* 38.11 0.00 
TUDPDTemp2 <- Temp 0.82* 44.76 0.00 
TUDPDTemp3 <- Temp 0.81* 42.91 0.00 
*p < 0.05 
As shown in table 12, most of the proposed items were significant and showed 
strong and high loading scores.  However, items TUDPD_Hypo3 and TUDPD_Spat1 
showed low loadings at 0.01 and 0.12 respectively.  Also, these two items were 
statistically not significant, with P-value scores higher than 0.05.  Based on the analysis 
of the loading results, items TUDPD_Hypo3 and TUDPD_Spat1 were removed.  
Removing these items was reasonable to improve the overall model scores. 
Following the analysis of outer loadings, using the remaining items, each 
construct reliability and validity was tested.  The values for composite reliability, the 
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Cronbach’s Alpha, the average variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were 
checked to evaluate constructs reliability and validity.  Table 13 shows the values for 
Cronbach’s Alpha, AVE, and composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was 
performed, and results were included in Table 13 as well.  The results of the discriminant 
validity, the diagonal values (in boldface) in the table, were greater than any of the 
internal factors correlations (or correlations of the constructs) for all constructs.  All AVE 
and composite reliability values are indications of conversion validity. Also, all 
Cronbach’s Alpha values are high.  Although the Cronbach’s Alpha score for the 
construct labeled “Hypo”, representing the hypothetical dimension of the psychological 
distance to threat un-desirability, was slightly lower than 0.7 at 0.68.  All other scores for 
this construct such as loadings, composite reliability, AVE, and discriminant validity are 
high.  






AVE PM RD RE Hypo Soci Spat Temp 
PM 0.83 0.89 0.62 0.79       
RD 0.91 0.94 0.85 -0.05 0.92      
RE 0.89 0.93 0.81 0.40 -0.12 0.90     
Hypo 0.68 0.86 0.75 0.48 -0.10 0.30 0.87    
Soci 0.75 0.86 0.66 0.40 0.06 0.17 0.62 0.81   
Spat 0.70 0.87 0.77 0.47 0.02 0.16 0.64 0.73 0.88  
Temp 0.75 0.86 0.66 0.50 -0.01 0.24 0.71 0.69 0.73 0.82 
 
 The Heterotrait-Monotrait ratio (HTMT) discriminant validity test was performed.  
Table 14 displays the summary of the HTMT test results.  The test results show that the 
values associated with PM, RD, and RE constructs are below the HTMT critical value 
and the discriminant validity was established.  However, as expected with the 
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psychological distance constructs, some of the values were slightly above the HTMT 
critical value.  Because these are formative constructs and are expected to have cross 
loadings, we performed the HTMT test on the latent constructs of the model, PM, CF, 
and TuD.  Table 15 shows the summary for the HTMT test results on the model’s 
constructs.  All values in the table were below the HTMT critical value.  That confirms 
discriminant validity among the model’s constructs.  
Table 14: Summary of the HTMT Discriminant Validity Test 
  PM RD RE Hypo Soci Spat 
RD 0.08           
RE 0.47 0.13         
Hypo 0.64 0.13 0.39       
Soci 0.50 0.09 0.20 0.87     
Spat 0.61 0.12 0.20 0.90 1.00   
Temp 0.65 0.09 0.29 1.00 0.90 1.00 
 
Table 15: Model Constructs' HTMT Discriminant Validity 
  CF PM 
PM 0.39   
TuD 0.27 0.61 
 
We also examined the Inner VIF for all items.  All items VIF scores were less 
than the cutoff value of 5.  Next, we examined the contribution of each component in the 
measurement diagram. Broadly, all of TuD components contributed equally, ranging 
from 0.24 for hypothetical TUDPD, to a high of 0.34 for temporal TUDPD.  Response 
difficulty (RD) showed negative relation at -0.60 with coping feasibility (CF) and 
response efficacy (RE) showed positive relation with CF at 0.74.  All of these paths were 
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statistically significant at p < 0.05. Thus, according to Hair et al. (2010) we concluded 
good reliability scores for the higher order constructs, TuD and CF.  
5.1.4 Paired and Independent Sample T-Tests 
To test whether the concrete and the abstract scenarios presented to each of the 
two groups actually created difference in perception, a series of t-tests were performed, 
including both paired and independent sample t-tests.  Table 16 summarizes the t-tests 
results.  The paired t-test was performed to compare the difference between means of 
threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation within each group 
when respondents were presented concrete scenarios versus abstract scenarios.  An 
independent sample t-test analysis was conducted to compare means of threat un-
desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation for both groups during the first 
event and the second event.  The first event included a concrete scenario presented to 
group one and an abstract scenario presented to group two.  The second event included 
the presentation of an abstract scenario presented to group one and a concrete scenario 
presented to group two.   
Table 16: T-Test Results Analysis 






Mean Difference  
(Paired T-Statistic) 
PM* 4.92 (0.63) 5.37 (1.08) -.45 (-5.58) 
TuD* 4.90 (0.96) 5.20 (1.03) -.30 (-3.52) 
CF 4.03 (0.76) 4.07 (0.78) -.04 (-0.70) 








PM* 5.50 (1.01) 5.65 (0.98) -0.15 (-2.01) 
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TuD* 5.19 (0.86) 5.57 (1.01) -0.38 (-4.70) 
CF 4.33 (0.89) 4.30 (0.95) +0.3 (0.50) 
Mean Difference Across Groups (Independent T-Test Statistic) 
PM* -.58 (-5.57) -0.28(-2.18) 
 TuD* -.29(-2.54) -0.37(-2.92) 
CF* -.30(-2.98) -0.22(-2.04) 
*P < 0.05 
On average, participants of group one showed change in their protection 
motivation when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 4.92, SE = 0.06) 
compared to their protection motivation when given an abstract threat context scenario 
(M = 5.37, SE = 0.09).  This difference, - 0.45, 95% CI [-0.60, -0.29], was significant 
t(130) = -5.58, p = 0.000, and represented an effect of d = -0.49.  Similarly, participants 
showed change in their threat un-desirability perception (M = 4.90, SE = 0.08) compared 
to their perception when given an abstract threat scenario (M = 5.20, SE = 0.09).  This 
difference, - 0.30, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.13], was also significant t(130) = -3.52, p = 0.001, 
and represented an effect of d = -0.3.  However, change in coping feasibility perception 
was not significant.  On average participants given a concrete scenario showed change in 
their coping feasibility perception (M = 4.03, SE = 0.07) compared to their perception 
when given an abstract scenario (M = 4.08, SE = 0.07).  This difference, - 0.05, 95% CI 
[-0.18, -0.08], was not significant t(130) = -0.7, p = 0.49, and represented an effect of d = 
-0.07. 
On average, group two participants showed changed in their protection motivation 
when given an abstract scenario for a specific threat context (M = 5.50, SE = 0.09) 
compared to their perception when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 5.65, SE 
= 0.09).  This difference, - 0.15, 95% CI [0.00, 0.29], was significant t(130) = 2.00, p = 
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0.047, and represented an effect of d = -0.17.  Similarly, participants showed change in 
their threat un-desirability perception (M = 5.19, SE = 0.08) compared to their perception 
when given a concrete threat context scenario (M = 5.57, SE = 0.09).  This difference, - 
0.38, 95% CI [0.22, 0.54], was significant t(130) = 4.70, p = 0.000, and represented an 
effect of d = -0.41.  However, change in coping feasibility perception was not significant.  
On average, participants given an abstract scenario showed change in their coping 
feasibility perception (M = 4.34, SE = 0.08) compared to participants given a concrete 
scenario (M = 4.30, SE = 0.08).  This difference, 0.04, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.2], was not 
significant t(130) = 0.5, p = 0.62, and represented an effect of d = 0.04. 
On average, group one participants who were given concrete scenario showed 
change in protection motivation (M = 4.92, SE = 0.06) compared to group two 
participants who were given an abstract scenario (M = 5.50, SE = 0.09).  This difference, 
-0.58, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.38], was significant t(260) = -5.57, p = 0.000, and represented an 
effect of d = -0.57.  In addition, group one participants showed change in threat un-
desirability perception (M = 4.90, SE = 0.08) compared to group two participants (M = 
5.19, SE = 0.08).  This difference, -0.29, 95% CI [-0.51, -0.06], was significant t(260) = -
2.54, p = 0.012, and represented an effect of d = -0.34.  Similarly, on average group one 
participants showed change in coping feasibility perception (M = 4.03, SE = 0.07) 
compared to group two participants (M = 4.33, SE = 0.08).  This difference, -0.3, 95% CI 
[-0.51, -0.10], was also significant t(260) = -2.98, p = 0.003, and represented an effect of 
d = -0.34.  
On average, group one participants who were given an abstract scenario showed 
change in protection motivation (M = 5.37, SE = 0.09) compared to group two 
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participants who were given a concrete scenario (M = 5.65, SE = 0.09).  This difference, -
0.28, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.03], was significant t(260) = -2.18, p = 0.030, and represented an 
effect of d = -0.29.  In addition, on average, group one participants showed change in 
threat un-desirability perception (M = 5.20, SE = 0.09) compared to group 2 participants 
(M = 5.57, SE = 0.09).  This difference, -0.37, 95% CI [-0.61, -0.12], was significant 
t(260) = -2.92, p = 0.004, and represented an effect of d = -0.37.  Similarly, on average 
group one participants showed change in coping feasibility perception (M = 4.08, SE = 
0.07) compared to group two participants (M = 4.30, SE = 0.08).  This difference, -0.22, 
95% CI [-0.43, -0.01], was also significant t(260) = -2.04, p = 0.042, and represented an 
effect of d = -0.23. Table 6 shows a summary of both the independent t-test and the 
paired t-test results.  The analysis of the results showed that hypothesis four and five are 
supported.  Table 17 summarizes the two hypotheses subject of study one and the 
conclusion of data analysis results relevant to each presented hypothesis.  
Table 17: Study One and Hypotheses Support 
Hypothesis Data Analysis Results 
H4: The greater the threat un-desirability, 
the higher the protection motivation 
Supported 
H5: The greater the coping feasibility, the 
higher the protection motivation 
Partially Supported 
 
5.1.5 Model Comparative Analysis 
This study included the performance of a comparative analysis.  The purpose of 
this comparative analysis is to compare the traditional PMT model used in the context of 
information security to the model presented by this research.  The performance of the 
traditional PMT model was measured by an instrument adopted from Johnston and 
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Warkentin (2010).  The traditional use of PMT measured the impact of threat and coping 
appraisals on protection motivation.  Threat vulnerability (Vul) and threat severity (Sev) 
constructs measured threat appraisal (TA). Three items, TVul1, TVul2, and TVul2 
measured threat vulnerability.  Four items, TSev1, TSev2, TSev3, and TSev4 measured 
threat severity.  Response efficacy (RE) and self-efficacy (SE) constructs measured 
coping appraisal (CA).  Three items, RE1, RE2, and RE3 measured response efficacy 
construct.  Three items SEff1, SEff2, and SEff3 measured self-efficacy construct.  
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to confirm the constructs 
measures.  The results are only presented for reflective constructs.  Software used is 
Smart-PLS version 3 (Ringle, 2015).  The procedures used are partial least squares (PLS) 
and PLS bootstrapping (5000 runs).  A bootstrap sample size of 5000 is recommended 
(Hair et al., 2011).  The procedure of bootstrapping, which validates the model, involves 
drawing a large number of subsamples from the original sample to allow the significance 
of formative indicators’ coefficients to be tested (Hair et al., 2010).  The outer loadings 
were analyzed for all items measuring PMT constructs.  All items showed high outer 
loading scores and P-values confirmed statistical significance of all items.  Table 18 
shows the outer loadings results for all items used. 
Table 18: CFA Outer Loadings for Items of the PMT Original Model 
Items Outer Loadings T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values 
PM1 <- PM 0.80* 34.71 0.00 
PM2 <- PM 0.86* 46.09 0.00 
PM3 <- PM 0.87* 67.42 0.00 
PM4 <- PM 0.46* 8.10 0.00 
PM5 <- PM 0.86* 61.03 0.00 
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RE1 <- RE 0.90* 80.40 0.00 
RE2 <- RE 0.93* 104.53 0.00 
RE3 <- RE 0.89* 53.58 0.00 
SEff1 <- SE 0.81* 35.11 0.00 
SEff2 <- SE 0.90* 68.06 0.00 
SEff3 <- SE 0.88* 62.19 0.00 
TSev1 <- Sev 0.85* 62.55 0.00 
TSev2 <- Sev 0.88* 102.97 0.00 
TSev3 <- Sev 0.81* 34.87 0.00 
TSev4 <- Sev 0.80* 30.06 0.00 
TVul1 <- Vul 0.91* 77.49 0.00 
TVul2 <- Vul 0.88* 66.12 0.00 
TVul3 <- Vul 0.90* 70.43 0.00 
*P < 0.05 
 
Following the factor analysis and the outer loadings of construct items, constructs 
reliability and validity was tested.  The values for composite reliability, the Cronbach’s 
Alpha, the average variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were analyzed to 
evaluate constructs reliability and validity.  Table 19 shows the values for Cronbach’s 
Alpha, AVE, and composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was performed and 
the results was included in Table 19 as well.   









AVE PM RE SE Sev Vul 
PM 0.83 0.89 0.62 0.79         
RE 0.89 0.93 0.81 0.41 0.90       
SE 0.83 0.90 0.75 0.32 0.55 0.86     
  92 
 
 
Sev 0.85 0.90 0.69 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.83   
Vul 0.88 0.92 0.80 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.56 0.90 
 
 Results analysis, as shown in the tables above support the reliability and validity 
of the constructs used in the traditional PMT approach.  We also performed the HTMT 
test on the model.  Table 20 summarizes the HTMT test results for the constructs.  The 
results show that all values are below the HTMT critical value, which confirms constructs 
discriminant validity.     
Table 20: HTMT Discriminant Validity Results for PMT Model 
  PM RE SE Sev 
RE 0.47       
SE 0.38 0.64     
Sev 0.30 0.27 0.27   
Vul 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.63 
 
Both models showed high scores while statistically significant.  However, the 
variance explained by each model varied significantly.  Table 21 shows comparison of 
the results for variance explained by each model.   
Table 21: Variance Explained by Each Model 


















0.10 0.34 0.19 0.02 
 
Also, Figures 7 and 8 show each model scores when measured by Smart-PLS.  




Figure 7. Smart-PLS traditional PMT model illustration 
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The original PMT model predicts that the change in coping appraisal and threat 
appraisal significantly influence protection motivation.  The analysis of the results using 
the traditional PMT model shows that while both constructs, coping appraisal and threat 
appraisal, are statistically significant, coping appraisal has a moderate effect size of 0.19 
and threat appraisal has a small effect size of 0.02.  The analysis of the results also shows 
that coping and threat appraisals in the model explain 19 % of the variance in protection 
motivation.  The model presented in this research predicts that change in coping 
feasibility and threat un-desirability significantly influence protection motivation.  The 
analysis of the results for the model presented by this research shows that coping 
feasibility has a moderate effect size while threat un-desirability has a large effect size of 
0.34.  The analysis of the results also shows that coping feasibility and threat un-
desirability explained 34% of the variance in protection motivation.  The results show 
that the model presented in this research offers a larger effect size with a much greater 
explanatory power.  This outcome supports the argument proposed in this research that 
this model is able to apply PMT based on its original intent that requires the perception of 
the threat to be on a personal level not against the organization.  The data analysis of 
study one supports that the decreased desirability of the threat and the increased 
perception of the feasibility of the coping mechanism significantly influence protection 
motivation. 
5.2 Study Two Data Analysis 
 The objective of study two is to test the entire research model.  The model 
evaluates the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and finesse) on protection 
motivation, while fully mediated by the individual’s affective perception of threat un-
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desirability and coping feasibility.  Study two will implement a cross-sectional web-based 
survey for data collection to test and measure the impact of all proposed research 
hypotheses.   
5.2.1 Sample Frame and Used Sample 
The sample frame for study two included currently employed full-time business 
professionals who use information systems for their daily jobs.  The sample frame does 
not include labor workers who do not use enterprise information systems daily to 
accomplish their job-related tasks.  The sample frame also does not include part-time, 
retired professionals, IT professionals, or professionals from technology companies.  A 
professional company, Qualtrics, was contracted for the recruitment of participants and 
the administration of the online survey.   
The company was contacted to provide 200 complete and usable responses.  
During the data collection process, a collaboration between the researcher and the 
company was followed to make sure all responses matched the sample frame criteria.  
The collaboration process included a soft launch to test the accuracy of the respondents 
screening process.  Following the soft launch, the process of the full data collection was 
performed.  During this process, the company provided a total of 247 responses.  From 
the total provided responses, 28 responses were removed for being incomplete, 
inaccurate, or from respondents from technology companies. The total number of 
responses used for the data analysis was 219 responses from a diverse sample of currently 
employed full-time business professionals.  
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5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The used 219 usable responses included 75% females and 25% males. Almost all 
of the participants, 98%, were older than were 21 years of age.  About 60% of the 
participants received a 4-year college degree or higher, 10% received an associate degree, 
20% received some college education, and 10% received high school diploma.  The 
majority of the participants, 52%, have been with their current company 6 years or more, 
42% have been with their company between 1 to 5 years, and only 6% have been with 
their company for less than one year.  Almost all of the participants, 97%, had some level 
of familiarity with computers, including 54% were extremely familiar with computers.  
Most of the participants, 81%, used computers all of the time to get their job tasks done.  
Descriptive statistics details are included in Appendix D.   
5.2.3 Changes from Study One 
 The key measures used in study two were refined based on the data analysis 
performed in study one.  Study one confirmed the use of most of the proposed key 
measures for threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation.  
However, the validity and reliability data analysis of the key measures supported the 
removal of two items.  Specifically, study two did not include TUDPD_Hypo3 and 
TUDPD_Spat1.  Also, study two included few refinements regarding terms used in the 
survey questions.  The term “distant” was replaced with “far away” in study two survey.  
Additionally, the term “hypothetical” that was used in the instrument of study one was 
changed to “speculative” in instrument used for study two.  Finally, because the sample 
frame of study two is different from the sample frame of study one, we included several 
additional statistical controls.  We also changed the way threat context was 
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communicated to the participants.  Study one presented to participating students two 
concrete and abstract scenarios of specific threats.  However, in study two, we asked the 
participating employees to select from a list of threats the threat that employees have 
heard about or have some experience with.  
5.2.4 Statistical Controls  
This study considered several control factors that could influence participants’ 
protection motivation.  Similar to study one, participants’ gender, age, computer 
experience, and risk appetite were used as statistical controls.  In addition, the study 
recognized that there are other statistical controls applicable to professionals that should 
also be analyzed.  These controls are participants’ industry type, department of work, 
level of education, years of work experience with current organization, and the level of 
technology use on the job.  Consequently, we included these demographics 
characteristics as baseline statistical controls.  Among all statistical controls, only 
computer experience and level of technology use were found to be statistically 
significant.  To arrive at the optimal control variable model, the non-significant statistical 
controls were removed.  The analysis of the control variables reveals that the level of 
computer experience and the level of technology use to perform work related duties 
impact protection motivation.  Those two statistically significant controls accounted for 
0.04 change in the independent variable.  Table 22 shows the statistical significance and 
the impact of the control variables.  
Table 22: Control Variables Statistics 




T Statistics P Values 
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Department 0.146  0.443 0.329 
Education 0.189  0.744 0.228 
Experience -0.073  0.248 0.402 
Gender 0.076  0.286 0.387 
Industry -0.22  0.721 0.235 
Technology Use* 0.707  2.309 0.01 
Risk Appetite 0.03  0.47 0.32 
PM Adjusted R-Square = 0.04 
*P > 0.05 
5.2.5 Construct Validity and Reliability 
 The validity and reliability of all constructs used in this study was tested.  This 
study included constructs measuring the dimensions of knowledge, knowledge breadth 
(KB), knowledge depth (KD), and knowledge finesse (KF).  It also included threat un-
desirability (TuD), coping feasibility (CF), and protection motivation (PM).  Knowledge 
dimensions constructs KB, KD, and KF were measured by three items respectively 
labeled (KB1, KB2, KB3), (KD1, KD2, KD3), and (KF1, KF2, KF3).  The remaining 
constructs – threat un-desirability, coping feasibility, and protection motivation measures 
followed the items confirmed by study one.  Table 23 shows the constructs loading 
scores.  
Table 23: Items loadings with T-statistics and P-values (CFA) 
  Items Loadings T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values 
Hypo1 <- Hypo* 0.85 29.33 0.00 
Hypo2 <- Hypo* 0.86 36.68 0.00 
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Hypo3 <- Hypo* 0.28 2.01 0.02 
KB_1 <- KB* 0.93 43.14 0.00 
KB_2 <- KB* 0.96 97.18 0.00 
KB_3 <- KB* 0.95 88.04 0.00 
KD_1 <- KD* 0.95 88.95 0.00 
KD_2 <- KD* 0.94 67.64 0.00 
KD_3 <- KD* 0.93 62.54 0.00 
KF_1 <- KF* 0.96 109.75 0.00 
KF_2 <- KF* 0.96 148.38 0.00 
KF_3 <- KF* 0.91 55.63 0.00 
PM1 <- PM* 0.82 22.54 0.00 
PM2 <- PM* 0.84 34.98 0.00 
PM3 <- PM* 0.79 17.08 0.00 
PM4 <- PM* 0.87 39.29 0.00 
PM5 <- PM* 0.87 39.70 0.00 
RD1 <- RD* 0.92 63.45 0.00 
RD2 <- RD* 0.93 66.28 0.00 
RD3 <- RD* 0.90 39.02 0.00 
RE1 <- RE* 0.90 49.59 0.00 
RE2 <- RE* 0.93 75.50 0.00 
RE3 <- RE* 0.90 49.85 0.00 
Soci1 <- Soci* 0.69 10.60 0.00 
Soci2 <- Soci* 0.83 27.76 0.00 
Soci3 <- Soci* 0.88 62.91 0.00 
Spat1 <- Spat* 0.40 3.28 0.00 
Spat2 <- Spat* 0.85 42.47 0.00 
Spat3 <- Spat* 0.85 31.53 0.00 
Temp1 <- Temp* 0.73 11.91 0.00 
Temp2 <- Temp* 0.73 15.94 0.00 
Temp3 <- Temp* 0.82 27.77 0.00 
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*P < 0.05 
As shown in table 23, all knowledge dimension items for KB, KD, and KF 
returned high loading scores.  Also the loadings of all other remaining items for PM, the 
four dimensions of TuD (Temp, Soci, Spat, and Hypo), and the two dimensions of CF 
(RD and RE) all showed high loading scores consistent with study one.  The table also 
show that all items were statistically significant with all P-Values less than 0.05.  
Following the analysis of outer loadings, each construct reliability and validity 
was tested.  The values for composite reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha, the average 
variance extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity were checked to evaluate constructs 
reliability and validity.  Table 24 shows the values for Cronbach’s Alpha, AVE, and 
composite reliability. The discriminant validity test was performed and results were 
included in Table 24 as well.  The results of the discriminant validity, the diagonal values 
in boldface in the table, were greater than any of the internal factors correlations (or 
correlations of the constructs) for all constructs.  All AVE and composite reliability 
values are indications of conversion validity.  Also all Cronbach’s Alpha values are high.  
Although the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for the construct measuring psychological 
distance to threat un-desirability were slightly lower than 0.7, all other scores for these 
constructs such as loadings, composite reliability, AVE, and discriminant validity are 
high.  




AVE Hypo KB KD KF PM RD RE Soci Spat Temp 
Hypo 0.67 0.86 0.75 0.87          
KB 0.94 0.96 0.89 0.23 0.94         
KD 0.93 0.96 0.88 0.20 0.80 0.94        
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KF 0.94 0.96 0.89 0.00 0.49 0.55 0.94       
PM 0.90 0.92 0.70 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.84      
RD 0.91 0.94 0.84 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.36 -0.11 0.92     
RE 0.90 0.94 0.83 0.37 0.52 0.49 0.35 0.52 -0.06 0.91    
Soci 0.73 0.85 0.65 0.61 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.81   
Spat 0.62 0.84 0.72 0.66 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.32 0.74 0.85  
Temp 0.64 0.80 0.58 0.68 0.20 0.21 0.05 0.45 0.12 0.36 0.66 0.68 0.76 
 
 We also performed the HTMT discriminant validity test.  The KB, KD, KF, RD, 
RE, and PM constructs values were below the HTMT critical values confirming 
discriminant validity.  In addition, as expected with the psychological distance constructs, 
some of the values were slightly above the HTMT critical value.  Because these are 
formative constructs and are expected to have cross loadings.  These results were 
consistent with study one. Table 25 summarizes the HTMT test results.   
Table 25: HTMT Discriminant Validity Test 
  Hypo KB KD KF PM RD RE Soci Spat 
KB 0.28                 
KD 0.26 0.85               
KF 0.09 0.53 0.59             
PM 0.63 0.46 0.45 0.24           
RD 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.39 0.12         
RE 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.38 0.58 0.07       
Soci 0.87 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.32 0.26 0.29     
Spat 1.03 0.33 0.27 0.14 0.55 0.15 0.42 1.07   
Temp 1.03 0.24 0.27 0.11 0.59 0.21 0.46 0.95 1.05 
 
5.2.6 Model Testing 
 Using the established controlled model, the effects of knowledge dimensions on 
the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility were tested.  Similarly, the 
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effects of threat undesirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation were 
tested.  Table 26 shows the statistical significance and the total effects of each construct 
in the model.  
Table 26: Total Effects of Model Constructs 
 Original Sample (O) T Statistics (|O/STDEV|) P Values 
CF -> PM* 0.34 4.32 0.00 
KB -> PM* 0.11 2.91 0.00 
KB -> TuD* 0.27 3.55 0.00 
KD -> CF* 0.41 5.43 0.00 
KD -> PM* 0.14 3.17 0.00 
KF -> CF* 0.18 1.70 0.04 
KF -> PM* 0.06 1.61 0.05 
TuD -> PM* 0.41 6.18 0.00 
*P < 0.05 
 As shown in the table, the results indicated that knowledge breadth was 
significant in influencing the perception of threat un-desirability.  In addition, both 
knowledge depth and knowledge finesse were significant in their influence on the 
perception of coping feasibility.  Consistent with study one, both threat un-desirability 
and coping feasibility significantly influenced protection motivation.  Although the 
impact of coping feasibility on PM was significant, the path analysis of one of its 
formative constructs, RD, was not significant.  Although RD is theoretically grounded 
and its factor analysis was significant with p-value less than 0.005, it did not provide 
significant impact towards CF.  To further understand this outcome, we looked at studies 
addressing task complexity as it relates to RD.  Gill and Hicks (2006) explained that task 
complexity contains four other views in addition to the psychological state or individual 
perception.  The other views of task complexity are information processing, structure, 
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problem space, and task characteristics.  Therefore, future research should be continue to 
explore the impact of the other four views on CF.   
Table 27 shows the variance explained by the research model.  The analysis of the 
results using the research model show that knowledge breadth has a small effect size on 
threat un-desirability.  Similarly knowledge fenisse has a small effect size on coping 
feasibility while knowledge depth has a moderate effect size on coping feasibility.  
Results show that both constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, each has a 
moderate effect size of 0.23 and 0.16 respectively.  The analysis of the results also shows 
that threat un-desirability and coping feasibility in the model account for 39 % of the 
variance in protection motivation. 
Table 27: Variance Explained by the Research Model 
























0.23 0.16 0.08  0.16 0.03 
 
The test of the research model indicated that the model fit (SRMR) value is 0.088.  
The fit scores, as well as the adjusted R square and the p-values, show that the model is 
significantly improved and capable of predicting a statistically significant influence of 
threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation.  These findings 
suggest that knowledge dimensions can form the personal perception of threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility, which in turn are sufficient and significant to influence 
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the motivation to protect information.  Figure 9 shows the path coefficients and the 
statistical significance of model’s constructs.  
 
Figure 9. Model path coefficients and significance 
 The analysis of the results show that all proposed hypotheses are supported.  
Table 28 summarizes all hypotheses presented by this research and the conclusion of data 
analysis results relevant to each presented hypothesis.  
Table 28: Research Hypotheses and Results Support for Study Two 
Hypothesis Data Analysis Results  
H1: The greater the breadth of 
knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the 
greater the un-desirability of the threat by 
end-users 
Supported 
H2: The greater the depth of 
knowledge in knowledge mechanisms, the 
higher the coping feasibility 
Supported 
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H3: The greater the finesse, the 
higher the coping feasibility 
Supported 
H4: The greater the threat un-
desirability, the higher the protection 
motivation 
Supported 
H5: The greater the coping 







CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION  
This chapter discusses interpretation of the results, limitations, contributions, and 
future research directions.  The chapter starts with the discussion of the data results and 
its support to the research objectives and the proposed hypotheses.  Following the results 
discussion, we address research limitations and the way these limitations were addressed.  
We then explain the research contributions to scholarly academic researchers and to 
practitioners based on data findings and the supported hypotheses.  We will explain how 
these findings contribute to further the work of academicians and practitioners.  We 
follow by discussing future directions of information systems research in the context of 
information security. Finally, we finish with our conclusion from this research.  
6.1 Interpretation of Results 
This research sought to understand the way knowledge mechanisms, such as 
SETA and security policies, influence employees’ secure behavior in a particular threat 
context.  Threat context represented the events or conditions that expose information 
systems to potential threats.  The research conceptualized knowledge mechanism across 
three dimensions: breadth, depth, and finesse.  The research also conceptualized the 
psychological process, to preserve the intent of PMT, based on the threat un-desirability 
and coping feasibility.  The four dimensions of the psychological distance, temporal, 




order construct (HOC).  Similarly, response difficulty and response efficacy formed the 
coping feasibility HOC.   
6.1.1 Study One Findings 
Study one measured how individuals’ psychological distance from a specific 
threat forms the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  The 
psychological distance from the threat was manipulated in terms of the concreteness or 
abstractness of a specific threat context.  The study also measured the impact of threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation.  Results show that the 
concreteness or abstractness of a threat context actually creates a significant difference in 
individuals’ perception regarding threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  Results 
also show that threat un-desirability and coping feasibility significantly influence 
protection motivation.   
We found that the abstractness or concreteness of a threat context cause change in 
the perception of threat un-desirability.  That change was significant across all four 
psychological dimensions.  As we argued, grounded by CLT, that variation along any 
dimension of psychological distance influenced the perception of threat un-desirability.  
The concrete threat context, manipulated across all four dimensions, increased the 
perception of threat un-desirability.  The change was consistent when compared the 
results within a group or between the two groups.  This supports the idea that the un-
desirability of the threat will increase when individuals perceive the threat on a closer 
psychological distance. This is consistent with the original intent of PMT.  Therefore, as 
we proposed, the affective perception of threat un-desirability will preserve the original 
intent of PMT in the context of information security. 
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An interesting finding related to the hypothetical dimension of the psychological 
distance is worth mentioning.  The results of the hypothetical dimension were statistically 
significant with high scores for reliability and validity.  However, we found that this 
psychological dimension provided slightly lower contribution to the change in the HOC, 
threat un-desirability, compared to the other three dimensions of the psychological 
distance.  We interpreted this to be due to the difficulty of manipulating a true and 
popular information security threat as hypothetical threat that is less likely to happen.  
The application of this finding will be addressed in more details in the implication 
section. 
Findings regarding coping feasibility showed different results within groups as 
compared to between groups.  The change in coping feasibility was not significant within 
each group when the threat context was presented in two sequential events alternating 
abstractness and concreteness of threat context.  We interpreted this to be a result of the 
learning experience.  Once a group receives knowledge about a threat and its mitigating 
action, whether in concrete or abstract fashion, any subsequent communication will 
provide additional knowledge, and the perception of the coping feasibility change will 
not be statistically significant.  In contrast, there was a significant change in the 
perception of coping feasibility between groups.  When we simultaneously presented an 
abstract threat context to one group and a concrete threat context to another group and 
compared the results, we found significant change in perception regarding coping 
feasibility between the two groups.  The group that received concrete threat context 
showed higher scores for the coping feasibility HOC compared to the group that received 
an abstract context.  This outcome supported our argument that the perception of the 
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coping feasibility will increase when an individual receives concrete knowledge about the 
context of that threat. 
Participants in both groups showed positive change in their protection motivation 
when they received knowledge about information security threat.  Results showed that 
the positive change in protection motivation was significantly higher for the participants 
of the group that received a concrete scenario compared to the group that received an 
abstract threat.  The results showed that coping feasibility and threat un-desirability 
positively influence protection motivation.  We found that as the perception of the threat 
un-desirability increases, the more motivated the individual would be to follow secure 
behavior.  Similarly, we found that as the perception of the coping feasibility increases, 
the more motivated the individual would be to follow secure behavior.  However, the 
results supported that threat un-desirability has the larger impact on protection 
motivation.  Thus, this is consistent with our argument that despite the importance of 
cognition, behavioral drivers are affective.   
In conclusion, the findings from study one supported that concreteness or 
abstractness of threat context will actually influence the perception of threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility.  The concreteness of the threat context will increase 
the perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  In addition, results support 
the positive impact of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility on protection 
motivation.     
6.1.2 Study Two Findings  
Study two measured the impact of knowledge dimensions (breadth, depth, and 
finesse) on protection motivation, while fully mediated by the employees’ affective 
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perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  The results show support to 
the proposed positive impact of knowledge dimensions on the perception of threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility.  Similarly, results support the positive impact of threat 
undesirability and coping feasibility on protection motivation.   
We found that knowledge breadth was significant in influencing the perception of 
threat un-desirability.  The variety of knowledge provide broader understanding of the 
threat context.  Breadth of knowledge will explain information security threats from 
external hackers, competitors, and natural disasters, as well as the internal threats caused 
by employees’ behavior, whether malicious or accidental.  The breadth of knowledge 
increase employees’ abilities to recognize from a personal perspective the range of threats 
and associate security risks that employees my face during their daily responsibilities.  
The personal understanding of the damaging details of the threat will increase threat un-
desirability.  Therefore, as proposed, breadth of knowledge provided a significant 
positive influence on the employees’ perception of threat un-desirability.  
We also found that both knowledge depth and knowledge finesse were significant 
in their influence on the perception of coping feasibility.  Understanding the details in 
depth about the available course of action will increase coping feasibility.  The 
contribution of both completeness of knowledge about a threat and the ability to apply 
innovativeness and creativity positively affect the perception of the feasibility of the 
coping mechanism.  The understanding of the complete steps needed to address any 
threat in a specific context while allowing employees to contribute with experience and 
creativity will reduce the perception of response difficulty and increased the perception of 
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response efficacy.  Therefore, both knowledge depth and finesse was found to positively 
influence coping feasibility.  
Consistent with study one, we found that both threat un-desirability and coping 
feasibility significantly influenced protection motivation.  Results show that threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility provided significant positive influence on protection 
motivation.  Therefore, we conclude that all proposed hypotheses of knowledge 
dimensions are supported.  Knowledge breadth, depth and finesse are key factors in 
forming the personal perception of threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, which in 
turn are sufficient and significant to influence the motivation to protect information.  
6.2 Limitations 
We acknowledge the limitations that faced this research.  Study one faced 
limitations due to the use of the experimental design and the sample representativeness.  
In addition, study one faced limitation due to the failure to manipulate response difficulty 
among participants.  Study one was an experiment with university students conducted to 
understand perceptions toward information security threats.  The use of an experiment 
with students presents concerns about the external validity of the study and the use of 
students to represent employees’ responses.  Similarly, some limitations also apply to 
study two.  Study two followed a cross-sectional web-based survey for data collection.  
The limitations of study two were associated with the use of a survey instrument, which 
presents concerns regarding internal validity and reliability of results.  The following 
section explains how we addressed these limitations.  
Conducting an experiment with students could present a limitation to the 
generalizability of the study and extending its conclusions to employees.  However, 
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research supported the use of students in the context of information security as a reliable 
sampling frame.  Students are members of an organization with valuable information 
assets and are subject to protection motivation factors similar to any system user 
(Warkentin et al., 2016).  We accepted these limitations, as the literature supports the use 
of students as a reliable sample frame.  Additionally, we were able to overcome the 
limitation of sample representativeness by presenting students with realistic information 
security threats relevant to university students.  This allowed students to become 
information systems end users who have valuable information that should be protected.  
Therefore, the results were realistic and represented accurate useful measures of 
perceptions, and not just a proxy to professionals.   
Another external validity concern may come from how realistic the manipulations 
of the experiment were in creating situations comparable to situations that employees 
may encounter in their organizations.  To increase the realistic perception of the 
experiment manipulations, study one was designed to present several situations that 
students may encounter in their daily routines similar to what the employees may 
encounter in work environment.  Study one required the communication of abstract and 
concrete realistic threat scenarios to construe threat perception on a higher or lower 
psychological distance from the end user.  Using multiple threat scenarios allowed the 
study to overcome this concern.  Covering multiple threat contexts between two groups 
of students allowed the study to measure the impact of a realistic threat context on 
participants’ affective perception of that threat’s un-desirability and coping feasibility.  
Only the manipulation of response difficulty was not successful.  We found that response 
difficulty is a complex construct with different facets that can contribute to the perception 
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of response difficulty.  We acknowledge this limitation and encourage future research to 
explore facets of task complexity.   
In conclusion, the experiment with students conducted in study one presented 
some limitations.  However, these limitations are not different from any other research 
method.  Also, many research studies used experiments when a convenience sample is 
possible with naturally formed groups such as students in a classroom (Creswell, 2014).  
Experiment, like the other methods, has several advantages.  One of the most important 
of these advantages is the strength of internal validity of results.  Therefore, experiments 
provide a powerful measurement with strong internal validity when used appropriately 
(S. Gupta, 2006; Poole & DeSanctis, 2004).  
Limitations that faced study two were associated with the use of a survey 
instrument.  The limitations here are similar to any study utilizing surveys for data 
collection and analysis.  Surveys present concerns regarding internal validity and 
reliability of results.  This stems from concerns regarding key measures, as well as a lack 
of consistency or accuracy in the provided responses.  To mitigate the concerns regarding 
key measures, study two utilized validated measures used in prior literature.  Also, study 
two followed scientific statistical processes to confirm constructs validity and reliability.  
The study also included several statistical controls to eliminate factors that might offer 
competing external explanations.   
Study two followed the recommended survey structure and length as explained by 
Hair et al. (2010), to enable accurate and consistent responses.  Also, the study followed 
strict criteria to eliminate incomplete or inaccurate responses.  Finally, to complete the 
data collection from a wide range of professionals, we contracted a professional company 
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to distribute the survey and collect the responses.  Although this decision may cause a 
concern regarding the researchers’ control over the sample and the collected responses, 
this approach is supported in the literature.  Further, the benefits of using professional 
survey provider was extensively discussed and explained (Creswell, 2014; Sue & Ritter, 
2007).  Additionally, we provided to the contracted company a specific sample frame and 
response collection criteria.  The contracted data collection company provided the 
researchers full access to the process to verify the sample frame and responses quality.  
We rejected any responses that did not perfectly match the sample frame or did not meet 
the response quality criteria.  Literature supports the use of surveys, as they offer 
economical access to large cross-sectional participants from the desired sample frame, 
which increases the statistical power (Creswell, 2014). 
All limitations were accepted and addressed appropriately.  In addition, these 
limitations can be viewed as opportunities for future research.  Some of these 
opportunities for future research will be discussed in a subsequent section.  
6.3 Contribution 
This research presented a theoretically grounded model that addresses current 
gaps in the information security literature.  The information security literature did not 
explicitly leverage knowledge dimensions.  We developed a unique study in the context 
of information security to measure the impact of knowledge dimensions on affective 
perception of security threats.  The research offers greater understanding of how 
knowledge dimensions influence employees’ psychological state to motivate compliance.  
The model presented in this research explains various application of knowledge 
dimensions in SETA programs and information security policies.  Understanding the 
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unique outcomes to each of the knowledge dimensions provide strategies regarding the 
use of knowledge mechanisms in the context of information security.   
Business experts advise that organizations should stay current and expand their 
abilities to provide information security insights regarding broader security threats, as 
well as security threats that are specific to the organization and its environment 
(Accenture, 2018).  This research presents a supported scientific approach to enable 
organizations to provide either broader or more specific information security insights.  
This research explains the strategic applications of knowledge dimensions, breadth, 
depth, and finesse.  Breadth of knowledge can address the broader security threats that 
any employee or organization could face.  At the same time, the model also explains how 
depth and finesse of knowledge can provide the needed accurate insights regarding 
specific organizational security threats. 
The breadth of knowledge brings the personal perspective to information security 
threats.  It enables organizations to provide insights regarding security threats, not only to 
protect the organization, but also to protect the employees themselves.  Employees will 
understand the common threats that any business environment with digital assets may 
face.  Our results support that breadth of knowledge will provide the needed perspective 
to keep employees vigilant regarding wide range security threats otherwise would be 
perceived irrelevant.  It illustrates threats on a personal level as it becomes relevant to 
each employee and their line of business.  Breadth of knowledge will allow employees to 
understand the degree of harm associated with security threats, which influence 
employees to see security threats as personal threats not as someone else’s problem.  The 
broader understanding of information security threats will enable employees to connect 
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the new and evolving threats with the existing and known information security threats.  
Breadth of knowledge will prevent the false sense of invulnerability and will motivate 
employees to follow secure behavior as their personal behavioral choice.   
Our results also supports that depth and finesse of knowledge will increase the 
perception of response feasibility.  Depth of knowledge provides understanding to actual 
and specific threats.  That will reduce mistakes and will enable fast and accurate secure 
behavior to prevent or mitigate specific threatening situations.  Depth of knowledge will 
increase the feasibility of security requirements.  Because such deep understanding will 
reduce the conflict between security demands and job requirements.  Depth of knowledge 
will support employees to perform their daily assignments while following secure 
behavior.  Finesse allows the applications of comprehension and understanding of 
security threats gained from historical events and prior experiences to mitigate security 
incidents.  Information security threats are increasing and advancing.  Utilizing 
knowledge dimensions enables organizations to take a more effective approach to 
mitigate the increasingly diverse and sophisticated information security threats.  
This research also provides a practical business approach to a traditionally 
technical topic.  The application of knowledge across these three dimensions will help 
provide guidelines that are more specific to practitioners.  Each industry faces different 
threats, and successful security countermeasures come from understanding these industry 
specific threats (Verizon, 2018).  Therefore, the generic “one-size-fits-all” approaches are 
ineffective, especially with ambiguous or unknown security threats.  This research shows 
the way to clarify threat contexts and the circumstances that may influence employees’ 
psychological state.  Our model can inform organizational leaders and allow them to 
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create policies and SETA programs tailored to employees’ specific domains and level of 
knowledge.  Knowledge dimensions will provide strategic understanding to inform the 
construction of security policies and SETA programs.  Organizational leaders can design 
security policies and SETA programs with feasibility and on a personal level.  The model 
explains the use of knowledge dimensions to focus employees’ perceptions on response 
feasibility and threat un-desirability.  The model allows the creation of feasible and 
desirable security strategies that are generalizable across different known threats as well 
as new threats that may emerge.  
This research provides greater understanding regarding the impact of the various 
dimensions of knowledge.  Understanding the influence of the breadth, depth, and finesse 
of knowledge on employees’ perception allows managers to create security policies and 
SETA programs that align business goals and security requirements.  Breadth of 
knowledge can reduce accidental security threats.  It provides broader understanding that 
allows employees to understand security threats relevant to their daily and personal 
activities.  Knowledge depth increases the accuracy of response implementation and 
motivates secure behavior.  Finesse is a dimension of knowledge that has not been 
considered in the context of information security.  Organizations often limit employees’ 
ability to implement finesse in their response to mitigate a threat.  This research provides 
support to the proposed positive impact of finesse dimension of knowledge.  We provide 
a unique contribution to allow organizations to recognize the potential of this untapped 
dimension of knowledge.  The mining of employees’ insights can improve the way 
organizations evaluate feasibility of responses to security threats.  Allowing employees to 
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collaborate and brainstorm will positively influence the perception of the feasibility of 
secure behaviors.  
This research offers noteworthy contributions to the literature.  The research 
contributes by providing a more improved model of information security.  The research 
model shows how to influence protection motivation in a way that limits results 
variations and allows PMT to work as designed in the context of information security.  
We also provide a theoretically driven re-conceptualization of PMT’s constructs to 
preserve its intent.  The conceptualization of PMT’s constructs was accomplished by the 
application of CLT to explain employees’ psychological process.  CLT explained the way 
individuals will construe information security threats on a personal level.  We were able 
to influence greater change in protection motivation by directing employees’ perception 
to threat un-desirability and coping feasibility.  Such a re-conceptualization of PMT’s 
constructs allows the presentation of information security threats on a personal level.  
The original context of PMT refers to a threat appraisal as the individuals’ 
assessment of their own safety if they follow a certain behavior (Maddux & Rogers, 
1983).  However, the applications of PMT in the context of information security 
measured threat appraisal by how well an individual understands organizational threat, 
not personal safety.  The position of the threat was removed from a personal threat and 
became an organizational threat.  Threat un-desirability differs from threat appraisal in 
the context of information security.  Threat un-desirability refers to the extent to which an 
individual will perceive a personal impact by the threat.  The perception of the threat is 
based on the individual’s psychological distance from the threat.  Therefore, threat un-
desirability re-conceptualizes PMT’s threat appraisal in the context of information 
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security to preserve the original intent of the theory and places the locus on the 
individual.  
Similarly, the re-conceptualization of coping feasibility refers to the process by 
which individuals evaluate the effectiveness of the available risk mitigating behavior.  
Feasibility consideration focuses on the level of difficulty regarding the mitigating action.  
The model presented in this research shows that the increased knowledge depth and 
finesse will direct employees’ perceptions towards the feasibility of the response 
mechanism.  The locus of coping appraisal is the task to be performed by the individual.  
The locus of coping feasibility is the individual.  Coping feasibility is concerned with the 
individual’s perception of the ease (difficulty) in performing an action.  Therefore, threat 
desirability re-conceptualizes the PMT’s coping appraisal in the context of information 
security by focusing individuals’ perception on the response appraisal from the feasibility 
perspective (response feasibility). 
The research presents a theoretically grounded model that allows PMT to explain 
the psychological process of protection motivation.  This model extends the theory while 
preserving its original intent that requires the perception of the threat to be on a personal 
level and not against the organization.  The model offers a larger effect size with a much 
greater explanatory power.   
This research provides a generalizable business approach for any incident-driven 
behavior that was typically viewed as a technical topic.  The presented model allows the 
research to be generalizable across different known threats, as well as new threats that 
may emerge.  The approach presented in this research focused on understanding the 
psychological process of any threat context, whether the threat is external, internal, 
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malicious, or accidental.  The context of the threat could be known and addressed by the 
organization, known but not addressed yet in organizational policies, or unknown and 
ambiguous.  Context of information security threats clarify threatening circumstances and 
influence perception.  The context of information security threats enable employees to 
distinguish between threats and follow secure behavior.  
6.4 Future Research Directions 
This research explored the impact of coping feasibility on protection motivation.  
The HOC was formed by response efficacy and response difficulty.  We found that 
response difficulty is a multi-faceted construct.  The literature shows that information 
processing, structure, problem space, and task characteristics are different facets that can 
contribute to the perception of task complexity (Gill & Hicks, 2006).  Therefore, future 
research should continue to explore the impact of the other dimensions of task 
complexity on coping feasibility.   
This study provides a reconceptualization to the psychological process of PMT.  
One of our objectives was to increase the generalizability of the model.  The study 
focused on the affective attributes as the main drivers of behavior.  The different 
components of PMT were conceptualized at different levels, i.e. task / context and 
individual.  Such re-conceptualization extends the opportunity for researchers to use the 
re-conceptualized constructs of PMT in different domains beyond information security.  
This generalizable approach presents opportunities for future research to study persuasive 
communications for any incident-driven behavior, including PMT’s original domain.  
Furthermore, we presented the influence of knowledge dimensions on protection 
motivation.  Previous research discussed the importance of the comprehensiveness of 
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knowledge in information security policies and SETA programs without explaining 
whether that means depth, breadth, or finesse of knowledge.  This research presented 
support to the specific impact of the three knowledge dimensions of breadth, depth, and 
finesse on the perception in terms of un-desirability and feasibility.  Researchers may 
pursue the application of this research model in a more specific approach.  Therefore, 
future research may study content design and structure of policy or SETA programs in 
light of these specific knowledge dimensions.    
6.5 Conclusion  
This research presented a theoretically grounded model to understand how 
knowledge mechanisms such as policies and SETA programs influence employees’ 
secure behavior in a particular threat context.  The research model addressed several gaps 
in information security literature.  Information security literature did not explicitly 
leverage knowledge dimensions.  The model presented in this research explains various 
application of knowledge dimensions breadth, depth, and finesse in SETA programs and 
information security policies.  In addition, the conventional application of PMT in the 
field of information security caused inconsistent and conflicting results.  The research 
presents an improved model that preserves the original intent of PMT in the context 
information security to limit the variation of results.  Finally, the research presented a 
generalizable approach for any incident-driven behavior and a practical business 
approach to a traditionally technical topic. 
To support the proposed hypotheses and to test the research model, this research 
applied quantitative methods and examined the relationships between variables to address 
the research questions.  The research empirically tested the model using two-study 
  122 
 
 
approach.  The first study was a scenario-based experiment with 262 students.  The 
experiment understood key psychological processes of threat perception.  The second 
study empirically validated the entire theoretical model.  We surveyed 219 employees 
across the organization with varied responsibilities and technical competence.  We tested 
the theoretical model using structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. 
Results show support to our proposal that the psychological distance from the 
threat allows employees to perceive the personal impact of the threat.  When threat 
context was constructed on a closer psychological distance, the perception of threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility increased.  Results support that the key psychological 
constructs, threat un-desirability and coping feasibility, influence employees behavioral 
choices.  Threat un-desirability focuses employees’ perception on un-desirable harmful 
outcomes of information security threats, while coping feasibility considerations direct 
employees’ perceptions towards action alternatives to protect the information.  Threat un-
desirability and coping feasibility showed significant positive impact on protection 
motivation.   
Finally, this research study provided several contributions and set directions for 
future research.  This research provided an improved model that explained protection 
motivation.  The research proposed an approach to limit PMT results’ variations in the 
context of information security.  Additionally, the study offered practitioners a business 
approach to a traditionally technical topic and researchers a generalized model to address 
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Items to measure protection motivation by Posey et al. (2015): 
1. I am motivated to protect my information from its security threats. 
2. My intentions to prevent my information security threats from being successful 
are high. 
3. It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information and 
information systems from security threats. 
Modified Protection Motivation Items  
1. I am motivated to protect my information / information systems from security 
threats now. 
2. It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information / information 
systems from security threats immediately. 
3. I have high intentions to prevent security threats from being successful. 
4. I predict that I will immediately protect my information / information systems 
from security threats. 
5. I intend to promptly protect my information / information systems from 
information security threats. 
Risk Propensity 
Scale to measure risk propensity (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995): 
Participants will be asked: “when you face a decision that affects you, how would you 
rate your tendency to (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely). . . 
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1. Choose more or less risky alternatives based on the assessment of others on whom 
you must rely 
2. Choose more or less risky alternatives which rely upon analyses high in technical 
complexity 
3. Choose more or less risky alternatives which could have a major impact on you 
4. Initiate a strategic action which has the potential to backfire 
5. Support a decision when I am aware that relevant analyses were done while 
missing several pieces of information 
Comparative Analysis 
The following instruments for threat and coping appraisals are adopted from 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) will be used for comparative analysis to show different in 
impact between the traditional use of PMT in the context of information security and the 
newly created instrument for psychological process manipulations.  The following items 
will be used to measure threat appraisal.  
1. My computer is at risk for becoming infected with malware. 
2. It is likely that my computer will become infected with malware. 
3. It is possible that my computer will become infected with malware. 
The following items will be used to measure coping appraisal: 
1. Anti-malware software is easy to use. 
2. Anti-malware software is convenient to use. 
3. I am able to use anti-malware software without much effort. 
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All items were measured using 7-point Likert-type scales from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 
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Group 1 Concrete Scenario 
You are a College of Business university student.  This is the last week of classes and 
finals are next week.  You are currently enrolled in a capstone project class.  All students 
must successfully complete this class in order to graduate.  The deadline for the complete 
project submission is in two days.   
Today you just learned about what happened to a close friend of yours who is also 
finishing the capstone project.  Last night as your friend was doing some last-minute 
internet research, his / her computer was suddenly locked.  A message on the computer 
told your friend to pay $2000.00 to unlock the computer.  Without unlocking the 
computer, your friend is unlikely to be able to finish the project and graduate.  You are in 
the middle of the same project with some internet research left to do.   
The university utilizes its official email system and its secure learning portal to 
communicate mitigating actions and periodically directs students’ attention to avoid 
various malicious security threats such as this one.  The university suggests the following 
actions to protect oneself from this specific threat:  
 Don’t visit or download materials from untrusted websites 
 Make sure your anti-malware/antivirus is up-to-date 
 Backup critical files using cloud storage 
 When suspicious view training videos or contact the university information 
security office for immediate help 
Training is always available online in the university’s website and in the designated IT 
training location across campus, or by phone using the university’s security hotline.   
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Table 29 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented in 
the concrete scenario. 
Table 29: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Concrete Version of 
Scenario 1 
Dimension Scenario terms Distance 
Temporal 
Events are current as indicated by:  
today, two days, and next week 
Low 
Spatial 




Events happening to the 
participant and participant’s close 
friend 
Low 
Hypothetical True event happened last night Low 
 
Group 1 Abstract Scenario 
You are a College of Business university student.  Next year you may plan to 
register for the capstone project class.  It is optional for students to complete the capstone 
project class before graduation.  If you choose to enroll, the deadline for the capstone 
project will be at the end of next year.    
As you work on researching for your project, you remember having heard a story 
some time ago about something happened to a large corporation.  What might have 
happened was that an employee of a company was doing some internet research when the 
company’s computer that the employee was using was suddenly locked.  A message on 
the computer told the employee that his/her company needed to pay money to unlock the 
computer.  Without unlocking the computer, the company was unlikely to be able to gain 
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access to files on this computer.  Next year, if you are in the capstone project, you may 
need to do some internet search for the project work.   
The university offers general guidelines to increase students’ awareness about 
potential malicious software.  The university does not communicate specific actions 
about information security threats that external companies may deal with, as this threat 
may not target students.  The university suggests reading their monthly information 
security newsletter to be familiar with current information security events.   The 
university relies on students to use their discretion when it comes to protecting 
themselves from security threats.  
Table 30 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented 
in the abstract scenario. 
Table 30: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Abstract Version of 
Scenario 1 
Dimension Scenario terms Distance 
Temporal 
Events are in the future or 








Events happening to random 
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Group 2 Concrete Scenario 
You are a College of Business university student.  Today, your close friend and classmate 
told you what just happened to him.  This morning he received the following email:  
You are receiving this email because you have authorized the university payroll to 
pay you through direct deposit.  Due to recent system update, your direct deposit 
routing and account numbers will need to be updated by Friday.  Failure to do so 
will stop the direct deposit access.  Any unprocessed payments will be deferred to 
the following pay cycle. For timely payments and successful direct deposit of 
your paycheck, please make sure your direct deposit information are updated 
immediately. 
To update your direct deposit information please click on the link below and 
verify account information. 
https://payroll.update-direct-deposite.edu 
Remember to save your current information once update is complete. 
Thank you.  
Payroll Team 
He receives a paycheck every two weeks because he is a student worker at the college of 
business.  As instructed, he followed the directions. Few hours later, he received a bank 
notification regarding an overdraft charge. When he inquired, he found out that his 
account was accessed this morning and his current balance is $0.00.  The transaction 
timestamp shows that the activity took place soon after he updated the direct deposit 
information.  Your friend was a phishing victim.  
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Typical phishing message always claim to be from a recognized source and ask to 
verify your information. It also contains a link to redirect the user to a specific website 
where they can collect the needed personal information.  To protect against this type of 
scam, your organization created policies that prohibit the communication of any financial 
information via email.  Your organization also provides an ongoing security awareness 
training that, among other things, explains how to detect such attack and discourages 
users from communicating sensitive personal or corporate information.  Also your 
organization created a two-step verification where the organization will send you a code 
then this code will be used to get to the login page.  
Table 31 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented 
in the concrete version of scenario 2. 
Table 31: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Concrete Version of 
Scenario 2 
Dimension Scenario terms Distance 
Temporal 
Events are current as indicated by:  








Events happening to the 
participant’s close friend 
Low 
Hypothetical True event happened this morning Low 
 
Group 2 Abstract Scenario 
Last year you heard a story about a worker at a company who received an email 
regarding his/her payment authorization.  The message informed the employee that their 
direct deposit information may need to be updated or a delay in payment may occur.  The 
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story was unclear whether there was an incident that followed.  This could be a phishing 
attempt to collect private information.  Although, this may never happen, once a year 
organizations send an email communication to encourage employees not to share their 
private information.  To protect against phishing scams, users are discouraged from 
sharing their own sensitive information.  Also companies may have policies and 
procedures to increase employee awareness of this threat.  
Table 32 shows the indicators of the psychological distance dimensions presented 
in the abstract version of scenario 2. 
Table 32: Psychological Distance Dimensions Presented in the Abstract Version of 
Scenario 2 
Dimension Scenario terms Distance 
Temporal 
Events are in the future or 








Events happening to random 
person (an employee in an 
organization) 
High 
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Study One Instrument 
Consent Form      
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on information security. This 
is a research project being conducted by Ashraf Mady, for the doctoral dissertation at 
Kennesaw State University. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.      
Participation  
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research 
or exit the survey at any time without penalty.      
Benefits      
You will receive course credit for participating in this research study. Randomly, 10 
participants each will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card. Also, your responses may help us 
learn more about the human behavior side of information security.      
Risks      
The risk from participating in this survey is minimal risk. The probability and magnitude 
of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves 
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life.       
Confidentiality      
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com where data will be stored in a 
password protected electronic format. Qualtrics does not collect any identifying 
information such as your name, email address, or IP address. Therefore, your responses 
will remain anonymous. No one will be able to identify you or your answers, and no one 
will know whether or not you participated in the study.      
Contacts      
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact me 
via email at anm9230@students.kennesaw.edu or my research supervisor, Professor 
Saurabh Gupta via email at sgupta7@kennesaw.edu 
  
 Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out 
under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board.  Questions or problems regarding 
these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State 
University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.  
 
Please select your choice below. Selecting "Yes I agree to participate" indicates that      
 You have read the above information 
 You voluntarily agree to participate 
 
Electronic Consent Selection:  
o Yes I agree to participate 
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o No I do not agree to participate (if this response is selected you will automatically 
exit the survey) 
 
Students who select “No I do not agree to participate” will immediately exit the survey. 




o Male  
o Female  
o Other  
o Prefer not to disclose  
 
Age 
o Under 18  
o 18 - 21  
o 22 - 30  
o 31 - 40  
o 41 - 50  
o Over 50  
 
Academic Class 
o Freshman  
o Sophomore   
o Junior  
o Senior  
 
Major  
▼ please select major: 
o Accounting 
o Computer Science 
o Finance 
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Describe your level of computer experience 
o Not at all Familiar  
o Slightly Familiar  
o Moderately Familiar  
o Extremely Familiar  
o Expert   
 
Imagine that you have to make a tough decision that involves trade-offs such as money or 
opportunity. Please read the questions below and rate your tendency to choose a risky 
alternative. 
 
I tend to choose a risky alternative... 










of others.  






o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
that has the 
potential to 
backfire.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
even when 





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Group 1 Concrete Scenario 
 
This study will randomly present two scenarios to you.  Each scenario will describe, in a 
similar way, a specific situation. Please watch the scenario and imagine yourself in this 
scenario.  Below is the script for the concrete scenario: 




You are a College of Business university student.  This is the last week of classes and 
finals are next week.  You are currently enrolled in a capstone project class.  All students 
must successfully complete this class in order to graduate.  The deadline for the complete 
project submission is in two days.   
 
Today you just learned about what happened to a close friend of yours who is also 
finishing the capstone project.  Last night as your friend was doing some last-minute 
internet research, his / her computer was suddenly locked.  A message on the computer 
told your friend to pay $2000.00 to unlock the computer.  Without unlocking the 
computer, your friend is unlikely to be able to finish the project and graduate.  You are in 
the middle of the same project with some internet research left to do.     
The university utilizes its official email system and its secure learning portal to 
communicate mitigating actions and periodically directs students’ attention to avoid 
various malicious security threats such as this one.  The university suggests the following 
actions to protect oneself from this specific threat:  
 
 Don’t visit or download materials from untrusted websites 
 Make sure your anti-malware/antivirus is up-to-date 
 Backup critical files using cloud storage 
 When suspicious view training videos or contact the university information 
security office for immediate help 
 
Training is always available online in the university’s website and in the designated IT 
training location across campus, or by phone using the university’s security hotline. 
 
Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:   
 
















immediate.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personal.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
realistic.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
distant.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  






















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
to me.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
nearby.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
actually 
happening.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personally 
relevant.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
instantaneous.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
hypothetical.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or 
abstractness 
Extremely abstract  
o Abstract  
o Somewhat abstract  
o Neither concrete nor abstract  
o Somewhat concrete  
o Concrete  
o Extremely concrete  
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job tasks.  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
I am motivated to protect my information from malicious websites attacks now. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from malicious 
websites attacks immediately. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
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o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I have high intentions to prevent malicious websites from being successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I predict that I will immediately protect my information from malicious websites. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I intend to promptly protect my information from malicious websites. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  




My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information 
and information systems. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information 
security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are 
severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
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In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and 
information systems are severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are serious. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are significant. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information 
and information systems is easy. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
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o Strongly agree  
 
I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information 
systems from information security violations. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from 
information security threats are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s 
information and information systems from security violations are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
  155 
 
 
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Group 1 Abstract Scenario 
 
Please watch the scenario below that describes a certain situation.  Imagine yourself in 
this scenario.  
Below is the script for the scenario:  
 
Please read the scenario below that describes a certain situation.  Imagine yourself in this 
scenario. After reading this scenario, please respond to the following questions.  
 
You are a College of Business university student.  Next year you may plan to register for 
the capstone project class.  It is optional for students to complete the capstone project 
class before graduation.  If you choose to enroll, the deadline for the capstone project will 
be at the end of next year.    
 
As you work on researching for your project, you remember having heard a story some 
time ago about something happened to a large corporation.  What might have happened 
was that an employee of a company was doing some internet research when the 
company’s computer that the employee was using was suddenly locked.  A message on 
the computer told the employee that his/her company needed to pay money to unlock the 
computer.  Without unlocking the computer, the company was unlikely to be able to gain 
access to files on this computer.  Next year, if you are in the capstone project, you may 
need to do some internet search for the project work.   
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The university offers general guidelines to increase students’ awareness about potential 
malicious software.  The university does not communicate specific actions about 
information security threats that external companies may deal with, as this threat may not 
target students.  The university suggests reading their monthly information security 
newsletter to be familiar with current information security events.   The university relies 
on students to use their discretion when it comes to protecting themselves from security 
threats.  
 
Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions: 
 
















immediate.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personal.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
realistic.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
distant.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
to me.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
nearby.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
actually 
happening.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
I think the damage from phishing attacks would be... 




















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personally 
relevant.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
instantaneous.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
hypothetical.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or 
abstractness 
o Extremely abstract  
o Abstract  
o Somewhat abstract  
o Neither concrete nor abstract  
o Somewhat concrete  
o Concrete  
o Extremely concrete  
 


















job tasks.  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  












o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
I am motivated to protect my information from phishing  attacks now. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from phishing 
attacks immediately. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I have high intentions to prevent phishing from being successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I predict that I will immediately protect my information from phishing. 
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o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I intend to promptly protect my information from phishing. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  




My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information 
and information systems. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  




My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information 
security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are 
severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and 
information systems are severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are serious. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are significant. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information 
and information systems is easy. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information 
systems from information security violations. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from 
information security threats are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s 
information and information systems from security violations are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
In your opinion, what was the difference between the two scenarios and did this impact 
your perception of the communicated threat? 










Group 2 Abstract Scenario  
 
This study will randomly present two scenarios to you.  Each scenario will describe, in a 
similar way, a specific situation. Please watch the scenario and imagine yourself in this 
scenario.   Below is the script for the abstract scenario: 
 
Last year you heard a story about a worker at a company who received an email 
regarding his/her payment authorization.  The message informed the employee that their 
direct deposit information may need to be updated or a delay in payment may occur.  The 
story was unclear whether there was an incident that followed.  This could be a phishing 
attempt to collect private information.  Although, this may never happen, once a year 
organizations send an email communication to encourage employees not to share their 
private information.  To protect against phishing scams, users are discouraged from 
sharing their own sensitive information.  Also companies may have policies and 
procedures to increase employee awareness of this threat.  
 
Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:   
 
















immediate.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personal.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
realistic.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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distant.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
to me.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
nearby.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
actually 
happening.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personally 
relevant.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
instantaneous.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
hypothetical.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or 
abstractness 
o Extremely abstract  
o Abstract  
o Somewhat abstract  
o Neither concrete nor abstract  
o Somewhat concrete  
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o Concrete  
o Extremely concrete  
 


















job tasks.  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
I am motivated to protect my information from malicious websites attacks now. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from malicious 
websites attacks immediately. 
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o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I have high intentions to prevent malicious websites from being successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I predict that I will immediately protect my information from malicious websites. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I intend to promptly protect my information from malicious websites. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
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My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information 
and information systems. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information 
security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are 
severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  




In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and 
information systems are severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are serious. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are significant. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information 
and information systems is easy. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information 
systems from information security violations. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from 
information security threats are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s 
information and information systems from security violations are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Group 2 Concrete Scenario 
 
Please watch the scenario below that describes a certain situation.  Imagine yourself in 
this scenario.  Below is the script for the concrete scenario: 
 
You are a College of Business university student.  Today, your close friend and classmate 
told you what just happened to him.  This morning he received the following email:      
 
You are receiving this email because you have authorized the university payroll to pay 
you through direct deposit.  Due to recent system update, your direct deposit routing and 
account numbers will need to be updated by Friday.  Failure to do so will stop the direct 
deposit access.  Any unprocessed payments will be deferred to the following pay cycle. 
For timely payments and successful direct deposit of your paycheck, please make sure 
your direct deposit information are updated immediately.  To update your direct deposit 
information please click on the link below and verify account information.  
https://payroll.update-direct-deposite.edu   
 
Remember to save your current information once update is complete.   
 
Thank you.    





    
He receives a paycheck every two weeks because he is a student worker at the college of 
business.  As instructed, he followed the directions. Few hours later, he received a bank 
notification regarding an overdraft charge. When he inquired, he found out that his 
account was accessed this morning and his current balance is $0.00.  The transaction 
timestamp shows that the activity took place soon after he updated the direct deposit 
information.  Your friend was a phishing victim.    
 
Typical phishing message always claim to be from a recognized source and ask to verify 
your information. It also contains a link to redirect the user to a specific website where 
they can collect the needed personal information.  To protect against this type of scam, 
your organization created policies that prohibit the communication of any financial 
information via email.  Your organization also provides an ongoing security awareness 
training that, among other things, explains how to detect such attack and discourages 
users from communicating sensitive personal or corporate information.  Also, your 
organization created a two-step verification where the organization will send you a code 
then this code will be used to get to the login page.  
 
 Based on the above scenario, please answer the following questions:  
 
















immediate.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personal.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
realistic.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
distant.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 





















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
to me.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
nearby.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
actually 
happening.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personally 
relevant.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
instantaneous.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
hypothetical.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Please rate your perception of this scenario in terms of its degree of concreteness or 
abstractness 
o Extremely abstract  
o Abstract  
o Somewhat abstract  
o Neither concrete nor abstract  
o Somewhat concrete  
o Concrete  
o Extremely concrete  
 





















job tasks.  





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
I am motivated to protect my information from phishing attacks now. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information from phishing 
attacks immediately. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
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o Strongly agree  
 
I have high intentions to prevent phishing from being successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I predict that I will immediately protect my information from phishing. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I intend to promptly protect my information from phishing. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  




My university’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
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o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my university’s information 
and information systems. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My university’s information and information systems are at risk from information 
security threats. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Threats to the security of my university’s information and information systems are 
severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
In terms of information security violations, attacks on my university’s information and 
information systems are severe. 
o Strongly disagree  
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o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are serious. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
I believe that threats to the security of my university’s information and information 
systems are significant. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
For me, taking information security precautions to protect my university’s information 
and information systems is easy. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
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I have the necessary skills to protect my university’s information and information 
systems from information security violations. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
My skills required to stop information security violations against my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
Employee efforts to keep my university’s information and information systems safe from 
information security threats are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my university’s 
information and information systems from security violations are effective. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
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o Strongly agree  
 
The preventive measures available to me to stop people from accessing my university’s 
information and information systems are adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree  
o Strongly agree  
 
In your opinion, what was the difference between the two scenarios and did this impact 
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Study Two Instrument 
Consent Form      
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on information security. This is a 
research project being conducted by Ashraf Mady, for the doctoral dissertation at Kennesaw State 
University. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.      
Participation  
  
Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research or exit 
the survey at any time without penalty.      
Benefits      
Your responses may help us learn more about the human behavior side of information security.      
Risks      
The risk from participating in this survey is minimal risk. The probability and magnitude of harm 
or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life.       
Confidentiality      
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com where data will be stored in a 
password protected electronic format. Qualtrics does not collect any identifying information such 
as your name, email address, or IP address. Therefore, your responses will remain anonymous. 
No one will be able to identify you or your answers, and no one will know whether or not you 
participated in the study.      
Contacts      
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact me via 
email at anm9230@students.kennesaw.edu or my research supervisor, Professor Saurabh Gupta 
via email at sgupta7@kennesaw.edu 
  
Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the 
oversight of an Institutional Review Board.  Questions or problems regarding these activities 
should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb 
Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268.  
Please select your choice below. Selecting "Yes I agree to participate" indicates that      
 You have read the above information 
 You voluntarily agree to participate 
 
Electronic Consent Selection:  
o Yes I agree to participate 
o No I do not agree to participate (if this response is selected you will automatically exit the 
survey) 
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Participants who select “No I do not agree to participate” will immediately exit the survey. 
Participants who select “Yes I agree to participate” will be directed to complete the survey below: 
 
Gender 
o Female  
o Male  
o Other  
o Prefer not to disclose  
 
Age 
o Under 18  
o 18 - 21  
o 22 - 30  
o 31 - 40  
o 41 - 50  
o Over 50  
 
Education 
o Less than high school  
o High school graduate  
o Some college  
o 2 year degree  
o 4 year degree  
o Master/Professional degree  
o Doctorate  
 
Employment 
o Employed full time  
o Employed part time  
o Unemployed  
o Retired  
 
What industry is the company you work for in?  
o Business  
o Technology  
o Construction  
o Art and Design  
o Architecture  
o Government  
o Other  




Years of professional experience with your current organization 
o Under one year  
o 1-5 years  
o 6-10 years  
o More than 10 years  
 
What department do you work in?  
o Information Systems/Technology  
o Marketing/Advertising  
o Finance  
o Business Strategy  
o Legal  
o Sales  
o Other  
 
Describe your level of computer experience 
o Not at all Familiar  
o Slightly Familiar  
o Moderately Familiar  
o Extremely Familiar  
o Expert   
 
How often do you work with technology in your job? Technology such as Microsoft Office, 
Email, Salesforce, Cloud-bases platform? 
o Never  
o Sometimes  
o About half the time  
o Most of the time  
o Always  
 
Imagine that you have an opportunity that exposes you to a financial or a personal risk. Please 
rate your risk-taking tendency below. 
 
I tend to choose a risky alternative... 













of others.  






o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
that has the 
potential to 
backfire.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
even when 





o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
News reports suggest that organizations and their employees continue to face circumstances that 
threaten the security of information/information systems. Such circumstances may threaten 
information's confidentiality, integrity, and availability.   Information security threats include 
phishing emails for unauthorized access to sensitive information, malicious software that can 
destroy critical data and suspicious websites that threaten data confidentiality. 
 
Please pick a threat that you have heard about or have some experience with: 
o phishing emails  
o malicious software applications  
o suspicious websites  
 
For each question below, please think of your organization's information security policies and 
training programs, then check the response that best characterizes how you feel about each 
statement when you face threats from [Insert User Selected Threat]. 
 








































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
My organization's information security policies and/or training programs  































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
My organization's information security policies and/or training programs allow me to be 
__________________ in finding solutions for threats from  [Insert User Selected Threat] 
 


















innovative  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
creative  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
experiential  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
















immediate.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personal.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
realistic.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
far away.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
to me.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
happening 
nearby.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
actually 
happening.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
I think the damage from [Insert User Selected Threat] would be... 




















o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
personally 
relevant.  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
instantaneous.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
speculative.  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 


















job tasks.  












o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Solutions available to keep my organization’s information / information systems safe from [Insert 
User Selected Threat] are successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
The available measures that I can take to protect my organization’s information / information 
systems from [Insert User Selected Threat] are effective. 
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o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
The preventive measures available to me to stop [Insert User Selected Threat] threats are 
adequate. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
I am motivated to protect my  information / information systems from [Insert User Selected 
Threat] now. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my information / information systems from 
[Insert User Selected Threat] immediately. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
I have high intentions to prevent [Insert User Selected Threat] from being successful. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
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I predict that I will immediately protect my  information / information systems from [Insert User 
Selected Threat]. 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   
o Strongly agree  
 
I intend to promptly protect my  information / information systems from [Insert User Selected 
Threat]. 
 
o Strongly disagree  
o Disagree  
o Somewhat disagree  
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat agree  
o Agree   





Study Two Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 33: Study Two Descriptive Statistics 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent 
Female 165 75.3% 
Male 54 24.7% 
Total 219 100% 
Age 
 Frequency Percent 
18-21 4 1.8% 
22-30 45 20.5% 
31-40 57 26% 
41-50 59 26.9% 
Over 50 54 24.7% 
Total 219 100% 
Education 
 Frequency Percent 
Less than high school 2 0.91% 
High school graduate 25 11.42% 
Some college 43 19.63% 
2 year degree 22 10.05% 
4 year degree 82 37.44% 
Master/Professional degree 40 18.26% 
Doctorate 5 2.28% 
Total 219 100% 
Professional Experience with Current Organization 
 Frequency Percent 
Under one year 14 6.39% 
1-5 years 91 41.55% 
6-10 years 37 16.89% 
More than 10 years 77 35.16% 
Total 219 100% 
Computer Experience 
 Frequency Percent 
Slightly familiar 6 2.7% 
Moderately familiar 73 33.3% 
Extremely familiar 118 53.9% 
Expert 22 10% 
Total 219 100% 
Technology Use in the Job 
 Frequency Percent 
About half the time 42 19.2% 
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Most of the time 80 36.5% 
Always 97 44.3% 
Total 219 100% 
Industry Type 
Business 40 18.3% 
Construction 5 2.3% 
Art and Design 5 2.3% 
Architecture 4 1.8% 
Government 22 10% 
Other 143 65.3% 
Total 219 100% 
 
 
